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Trust, trustworthiness and trust-building in international 
policing missions1 
 
 
 
 
Andrew Goldsmith and Vandra Harris 
 
 
 
 
Trust is widely accepted as being central to domestic police effectiveness and 
legitimacy. It facilitates dealings between the public and the police, and eases 
relationships between the individuals within police services. In this article, we 
argue trust has an equally fundamental role in international policing missions, 
yet establishing trustworthy policing arrangements is even more difficult for a 
variety of reasons. We examine a number of these reasons here. The data used is 
drawn from interviews with Australian police on international deployment in 
Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea.  As the data from case 
studies indicate, international policing missions often take place in countries 
with low levels of public trust in the police. For many in these countries, 
international interventions can be matters of ambivalence or even induce active 
resistance and resentment. Finding ways of cooperating and collaborating, if 
not trusting, are fundamental to achieving international policing mission 
objectives. The article therefore considers some ways in which these missions 
may minimise distrust and earn trust. 
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 “It is one thing to walk in and everyone says, ‘G’day’ and shakes your hand 
and is all smiles, but it is another thing to have the trust of the people.” 
[R02] 
 
 “You would have to impress upon them the importance of not killing 
anybody especially while we were there because we would get the blame 
and you know if you had any respect for us, you wouldn’t do it and that’s 
where that friendship and trust and that built up “[R49] 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we explore everyday understandings of trust among police 
peacekeepers and capacity-builders in international police missions. These views 
inform how international police personnel approach their work in missions, 
including how they deal with local police counterparts and local people, and how 
they assess the effectiveness and relevance of what they do. As the objectives of 
these missions are typically quite ambitious (restoring peace and security; 
re/building reliable, effective local police forces etc), and often quite challenging 
at the local level in terms of securing consent and support for change, measures 
of trust and trustworthiness, we believe, provide insight into the processes by 
which local consent and commitment to the agendas of these missions are 
obtained or withheld.  As the two opening quotes from our interview-based 
study of Australian police personnel suggest, establishing trust, while often vital 
to building effective relationships, can prove elusive.  
 
International peacekeeping was founded upon the principles of impartiality, 
consent, and use of minimum force (Bellamy et al 2004: 96). In recent years 
peace mission mandates have changed, becoming more ambitious in scope and 
focusing more on intra-state conflicts. Police personnel have joined military and 
civilian personnel in what are sometimes referred to as ‘extension of state 
authority’ exercises (Jones et al 2010: 24). The role of international policing in 
the extension of state authority objectives has thus transformed the notion of 
policing in the past two decades from being an essentially domestic idea and 
practice to one of international political and social significance. However, this 
trend is not entirely new. The role of colonial and European police in matters of 
general administration and governance has been noted in studies of colonial 
policing and other policing systems (Dinnen and Braithwaite 2009; Neocleous 
2011). In this sense, there are undoubtedly points of continuity between the 
“export version” of Anglo-American policing and previously enacted models of 
Western policing.  It is not  surprising then that international policing missions 
share the principles of  impartiality, consent, and minimum force were also 
foundational principles of the Anglo-American model (Reiner 2010).  
 
Policing, like many other activities, benefits from cooperation and collaboration 
with other partners, including members of the community. Obtaining 
cooperation can be particularly difficult given the nature of police work. When 
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this challenge is transferred to a foreign context, the difficulties are greatly 
magnified. International policing missions frequently intervene in settings in 
which public trust in police agencies and personnel is historically low or absent – 
what can be considered “low-trust” settings (Fukuyama 1995; Goldsmith 2005). 
The absence of trust has been identified as one of the key challenges confronting 
modern peacekeeping operations. According to a recent report, there is “the 
need to build trust between key players in peacekeeping” (Parker 2010: 4). The 
report identifies the need to build trust “among the Security Council, Secretariat, 
troop, and financial contributing countries,” and describes this need as 
“fundamental, achievable, and necessary for effective peacekeeping” (Parker 
2010: 6). The absence of trust, as implied here, constitutes a limitation upon the 
level of cooperation and commitment among participating agencies that is 
needed to achieve strategic objectives (peace restoration; police reform etc.)  
 
In this paper, we take this point one further step, suggesting that the need to 
build trust is not limited to ‘key players’ in the sense of contributing countries 
and UN bodies. It is also of crucial importance to achieving strategic and tactical 
success in individual peace operations.  In this paper, we propose to explore a 
number of dimensions of the place of trust in international policing missions.  We 
accept the premise that generally policing is more benign and broadly acceptable 
if it is undertaken in a genuine trusting environment.  We also take the view that 
as international police peacekeeping is largely charged with restoring security on 
the ground and, increasingly, ensuring its maintenance over time, those who 
have experienced or who are experiencing insecurity and likely to be highly 
distrustful of international agencies and their staff need nonetheless to to be able 
to trust those agencies and their personnel  A critical question then is what 
conditions would permit an individual or society suffering from insecurity to 
trust an outside agency or its staff to help them?  In short, what facilitates the 
trustworthiness of that agency or individual?    
 
In section 2, we look at the literature on trust and draw upon that literature to 
sketch out some of the challenges of dealing with distrust and building trust that 
might arise in the context of international policing missions involved in 
peacekeeping and capacity-building tasks. In section 3, we outline the nature of 
the research undertaken with Australian police personnel who served on these 
missions which generated interview data from more than 120 interviews, In 
section 4, this data is drawn upon to extend the analysis, and in particular 
identify the ways in which trust was a meaningful concept in the work 
undertaken by these police officers. Section 5 concludes the discussion. 
 
2. Trusting International Policing Missions 
 
Trust, for different reasons, is problematic for international policing missions. 
One reason relates to the nature of policing and police work itself. Police officers 
typically trade in suspicion and distrust (Reiner 2010; 121-122); they are not 
inclined to be trusting. In the course of their daily work they must often 
challenge people in terms of what they are saying or doing; the police 
intervention may also result in a loss of liberty or privileges, risking the 
displeasure (or worse) of those deprived. Police work is also uncertain in its 
 4 
aims and methods; it exhibits role ambiguity (Thomas 1998). As we will see 
below, that role ambiguity is even greater when its context is international 
rather than domestic. In most societies, as maintainers of order, police tend to 
clash more frequently with members of marginalised communities (Choong 
1997). Racial differences frequently are reflected in differentials of police 
treatment and public respect for the police (Smith 2010). Certain groups have 
suffered disproportionately from what is sometimes called over-policing and 
under-policing (OSJI 2009; Skogan 2006; Sharp and Johnson 2009).  Being the 
subject of too much police attention, or failing to obtain their services in 
moments of need, are negative perceptions that work against the establishment 
of trusting relationships. 
 
A second reason relates to the particular difficulties of working in foreign 
settings. As has been also noted in respect of international business 
relationships, unfamiliarity with local conditions and people tends to work 
against establishing ready trust (Brenkert 1998). International policing missions 
in this way resemble other kinds of international strategic alliances, requiring 
different forms of local cooperation and collaboration. “Trust may be expected to 
be particularly important in international collaborations, where the negative 
effects of cultural and physical distance are enhanced and the differences in 
political, social, and economic contexts may be large” (Zhang and Huxham 2009, 
187).   
 
Many mission environments can be classified as low-trust settings, measured in 
terms of interpersonal trust within the society in question, trust in government 
aind institutions, and willingness to trust outsiders (Goldsmith 2005). Often past 
colonial histories and previous experiences of regime-style policing, compound 
the difficulties international police personnel are likely to face in gaining the 
confidence of local people (Goldsmith 2003; Dinnen and Braithwaite 2009). 
Often the average person’s view will be of police individually and collectively as 
abusive, corrupt, or at best, indifferent to their security needs. In short, 
structural feature of these environments are likely to combine with cultural 
differences and situational factors to render the task of building trust with local 
communities and counterparts extremely difficult and perhaps impossible.  
Dealing with distrust, and building trust, will probably require a lot more than 
smiles from strangers bearing sweets for the local children. As Tankebe (2009: 
1281) noted in relation modern Ghana, “utilitarian factors [will be] important in 
shaping public cooperation with the police.” 
 
A third factor that works against ready trust is the circumstances in which the 
missions are launched and implemented. Many missions are interventions, 
whether they be mandated (say by the UN Security Council), or by agreement 
(sometimes called ‘cooperative interventions’).  Often as well, there are 
circumstances of emergency or urgent need that make the pace of intervention 
quick and therefore limited in terms of any opportunity to plan carefully, to 
negotiate in advance with affected parties, or to establish clear and shared 
objectives. Whether the primary mission focus is peacekeeping or capacity-
building, the fact remains that the interventions are premised upon some kind of 
inequality between the interveners and the intervenees. It is due to the ascribed 
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superiority of the mission in its ability to restore order or re/build local police 
forces that the mission is present. This inequality is reinforced over time as the 
superior capacity of the mission in terms of resources and knowledge is 
demonstrated during the life of the mission.   
 
A failure to negotiate objectives and priorities with local police, and blindness to 
the persistence of differences of expectations, can result in a lack of local support 
(Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007). While adequate planning around objectives and 
collaborative mechanisms at the start is fundamental in building trust, how 
international personnel then conduct themselves in mission is crucial, and 
potentially highly destructive of public confidence and trust. As trust implies 
vulnerability (Montgomery 2008), the excesses or abuses of one party can be 
extremely damaging to the willingness to trust of the other. Even single acts that 
violate local expectations can do substantial damage to international trust-
building agendas. If international police personnel become involved in 
corruption or sexual exploitation of local people, as has happened on numerous 
occasions within some UN missions, this can attract negative publicity and local 
public resentment (Odello 2010). Equally if police fail to restore order promptly 
after a period of societal conflict, public expectations can be disappointed and 
result in greater social distance between the international police and local 
people. 
 
 
Trust and Trust-building 
 
Some general observations can be made about trust with application to 
international policing missions.  
 
Firstly, for the most part, the data discussed here, derived from interviews 
focusing upon dealings with other individuals, addresses interpersonal rather 
than institutional trust. However, these concepts are interrelated and both are 
important from the point of view of meeting the objectives of international 
policing missions. The relationship between the two is visible in a number of 
ways. Individual incompetence, for example, can undermine trust in institutions 
(Thomas 1998). In other words, a police officer who abuses her power can 
negatively impact upon public perceptions of the organization to which she 
belongs. On the other hand, there are studies to suggest quite strongly, as one 
might expect and indeed hope as a member of an international policing mission, 
that building interpersonal trust locally can contribute to building institutional 
trust on a wider basis (Tranter and Skrbis 2009). More work is needed to 
establish under a variety of conditions which measures of interpersonal trust can 
contribute to trust-building in institutions. However, a recent study among 
young people in Queensland (Tranter and Skrbis 2009) indicated that having 
trust in teachers tended to increase institutional trust not just in schools but in 
other institutions as well, including police, television, and politicians. This 
finding is certainly consistent with the idea that trust, and more particularly 
distrust, is often generalised across a range of institutions and settings 
(Gambetta 1988). For present purposes, while much still remains uncharted in 
terms of the interrelationship between interpersonal and institutional trust, 
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there is adequate evidence of the importance of dealing with interpersonal trust 
(and distrust) as part of any strategy for improving trust in public institutions.  
 
Secondly, people and cultures differ in terms of their willingness to trust. Some 
cultures for intrinsic or extrinsic reasons may be less inclined to trust outsiders 
than others (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995). This variability in willingness to 
trust will impact differentially in terms of a mission’s ability to build trust. Then,  
trust is relational in character; it only exists when there is an actual or potential 
relationship between two or more parties.  Trust will therefore be influenced in 
part by the position and attitude of the parties to a particular relationship.  If 
there is actual or perceived imbalance or inequality, that factor can be expected 
to impact upon the capacity for trust to emerge, and the kinds of relationships 
that are possible. Power imbalances are not always sufficiently recognised by 
interveners, and need to be managed as part of any trust-building exercise 
(Vangen and Huxham 2003). Where there is no previous relationship, 
establishing trust will require providing reasons for entering a collaboration or 
providing cooperation. Establishing and meeting local expectations in tangible 
ways is widely seen as important to taking the first steps towards establishing 
trust. In other words, successful collaborations will provide a basis for the 
emergence of trust (Vangen and Huxham 2003). 
 
It is also important to recognise the association between trust and risk and 
vulnerability. Trust is crucial to enhancing feelings of insecurity. Misztal (1996: 
102) describes trust as “a protective mechanism relying on everyday routines, 
stable reputations and tacit memories, which together push out of modern life 
fear and uncertainty as well as moral problems”.  Similarly Luhmann has 
described trust as a “solution for specific problems of risk” (1988: 95). In these 
pithy definitions, we can recognise the pertinence of trust to the challenges 
facing international policing. Paradoxically though,  trust itself can also serve as a 
precondition to taking risks; only when people are confident of their relative 
safety will they be prepared to undertake certain risky activities. As effecting 
change is common to both international peacekeeping and capacity-building 
missions, recognising local feelings of vulnerability on each issue is fundamental 
to effective trust-building.  Sensitivity to past negative experiences at the local 
level is required: 
 
 Where people have little history together, or an erratic history of 
cooperation mixed with exploitation, or a consistent history of failure to 
cooperate, people will distrust one another, avoiding collaborative 
endeavours without guarantees on the other’s behaviour (Burt 2001, 33) 
 
 
In terms of being worthy of trust (ie trustworthy), there is considerable 
consensus about the qualities of an individual or organisation that facilitate 
trustworthiness. The three most commonly mentioned are:  competence, 
impartiality, and beneficence (Montgomery et al 1998). The first refers to having 
the relevant skills and capability to assist; the second refers to a lack of bias and 
a willingness to follow a principled approach to providing assistance, while the 
third quality refers to acting towards the other person with a view to assisting, 
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rather than harming, them. Where one or more of these qualities is seen to be 
lacking or missing in an individual or an institution, there will be a reluctance to 
cooperate or collaborate, making the establishment of trust difficult.   
 
Different kinds of , or bases for, trust, need to be considered. Some policing 
scholars have pointed to motive-based trust.  This “turns on whether the police 
are seen as having the best interests of the community at heart’ (Jackson and 
Bradford 2010: 245).  International missions face many difficulties under this 
standard. They have to be able first to know what those ‘best interests’ are. This 
may be no easy matter in the circumstances faced by international policing 
missions, especially since in the presence of recent conflict there may be many 
divisions over what this might mean.  Furthermore, there are the vexed issues of 
whether the mission has the mandate and capacity to respond effectively, and 
more critically, whether it will be appropriate to do so in volatile circumstances. 
Local divisions within the community, and distrust of outsiders, will mean that 
showing a commitment to ‘the community’ will often not be easy. 
 
Another basis for trust has been linked to procedural justice. On this perspective, 
it is suggested that trust in legal authorities (including police) can emerge from 
fair and respectful processes, independently (under some conditions at least) of 
the particular substantive outcomes achieved (Tyler 1990; Hough et al 2010). In 
other words, treating people fairly can contribute to feelings of trust and 
confidence in police and other legal authorities; even if the party in question 
does not get the substantive result he or she was seeking. This approach 
endorses the value of normative commitment (or cooperation) over 
instrumental (calculative) cooperation.  However, in relation to policing minority 
communities (Cherney and Murphy 2011) and national communities deeply 
distrustful of police (Tankebe 2009), where past histories have given little cause 
for confidence in future different relations between police and these 
communities, it is far from clear that procedural justice alone can work to build 
trust and confidence in policing.  
 
Finally, in terms of building or establishing trust, it may  be useful to draw on the 
work of Lane (1998) to distinguish between calculative, cognitive, and normative 
trust. In effect, this scheme presents three different kinds of trust that might be 
‘built.’ Calculative trust is trust based upon a calculation of costs and benefits of 
particular courses of action. Costs here include the possibility of deterrence and 
damage to the reputation of parties. As Child notes (1998: 245), this form of trust 
is particularly apt in the context of new relationships, and to the formation of 
new international strategic alliances.  
 
Over time, common ways of thinking may emerge, allowing parties to predict the 
actions of the other. This is cognitive trust, a sharing of cognitions. Sometimes 
referred to as knowledge-based trust, it relies on information rather than 
deterrence. This is a luxury infrequently afforded in the context of most 
international policing missions, especially at the interpersonal level, where 
duration of engagements is typically short, often as little as a few weeks or 
several months.  The third, normative trust, “depends on people sharing common 
values, including a common concept of moral obligation” (Child: 1998: 245). It 
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resembles what some scholars call identification-based trust, in which there is a 
high degree of mutual understanding of each other’s wants. Again, the 
constraints of policing missions make this kind of trust difficult to establish. 
 
A fourth kind, affective trust, is sometimes mentioned in the trust literature. This 
is based upon emotional ties between people. These are usually built up over 
time on the basis of effective communication. As Child notes (1998: 246), this 
kind of trust can be expected rarely in international strategic alliances given 
issues such as different backgrounds and languages, and the risk of competing 
objectives.  
 
 
International Strategic Alliances and Institutional Trust 
 
In terms of institutional settings for international policing missions, there are 
useful parallels in seeing these missions as involved in forms of international 
strategic alliances (ISAs). Both missions and international business ventures 
share in common the fact that they are inter-agency cooperative arrangements 
“aimed at pursuing mutual strategic objectives” (Das and Teng 2000: 77).  Das 
and Kumar (2000; 2009) look at these arrangements in terms of the presence or 
absence of commitment and forbearance, the two essential elements of successful 
inter-partner harmony.  The former refers to the degree of interdependency 
established in the pursuit of shared goals, while the latter relates to “the ever-
present need to be restrained, patient, and open-minded in circumstances 
involving actual or perceived incompatibility of the member firms’ actions with 
expected norms of behaviour” (Das and Kumar 2009:38). The issues of patience 
between mission partners and the shaky nature of shared commitments is one 
explored in our data below. 
 
In general terms, ISAs face two challenges. The first is ensuring that there are, in 
fact, mutual strategic objectives, which in conflict-torn environments can be 
difficult. As noted earlier, this aspect is often given insufficient attention in the 
early stages. The second is the fact that the assumptions about “what can be 
taken for granted” within the alliance are likely to be different, rather than 
shared (Child 1998, 243). Identifying, and preserving, common goals can be 
difficult, as we have noted already. In policing as in business,  tendencies to 
compete (or at least resist) exist alongside tendencies to cooperate, and can 
often undermine trust-building.  In business, such alliances tend to be unstable 
and to fail (Das and Teng 2000).  The same can be noted about many previous 
international peacekeeping and capacity-building initiatives (Chesterman 2004; 
Jones et al 2010).  Studying what makes international strategic alliances in 
general effective may then pay dividends for international peacekeeping 
missions. 
 
 
Falling Short of Trust 
 
For many reasons then, international policing missions will find themselves in 
environments in which, at best, trust in them as individuals as well as the 
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mission level, is in short supply. This reality poses, as has been already 
mentioned, the challenge of how, over time, to build trust where it is not present. 
It also poses questions about dealing with distrust that is preventing improved 
policing and security from being established (see Goldsmith 2005).  Both these 
goals may take time, or indeed never be achieved in the time available. Early on 
in missions then, proxies for trust will often be necessary in order to make 
changes. In extreme life-threatening circumstances (eg humanitarian disasters, 
ongoing major violence), people at risk may have to ‘trust’ outsiders because 
they feel they have little option (Montgomery et al 2008).  Under a variety of 
circumstances of conflict and ignorance, cooperation and compliance therefore 
can occur without real trust. Commitment over a longer term however is a more 
difficult accomplishment that may be less responsive to material inducements or 
emergency provisions.  
 
In the present context, it seems useful to consider a number of ‘motivational 
postures’ that can be displayed towards those seeking trust or at least 
compliance or cooperation (Braithwaite et al 2007). As the prevalence of distrust 
or at least an absence of trust would suggest, a variety of stances short of trusting 
cooperation with international policing personnel must be anticipated. In 
addition to defiance, forms of game playing, resistance, disengagement, 
cooperation and capitulation can be expected in certain circumstances.  Many of 
the challenges experienced by our respondents can be interpreted in terms of 
these different postures.   
 
In addition, the wider trajectory of particular missions can be seen often in terms 
of a shifting menu of different postures displayed by local politicians, police and 
members of the community. Over time, one could expect the same people to 
display different dispositions in some cases (though, some may remain fixed), 
while different segments will be more predisposed to trust than others.  As our 
data discussion below will confirm, much remains unknown regarding how 
dispositions of defiance and disengagement can be moved in the direction of 
cooperation and commitment in the contexts we are concerned with here. As 
seen in other areas of international development and security sector reform, the 
“quick wins” approach - in the sense of “providing immediately tangible benefits 
to the population” – in order to “impact positively upon formal and informal 
political dynamics at all levels” (Stabilisation Unit 2009) suggests that calculative 
approaches are probably inevitable at the start of most international policing 
missions as well.  
 
In terms of dealing with distrust, it must be remembered that distrust is not 
always a bad thing. It can indeed often make sense. The East Timorese who hid in 
the jungles from the Indonesian police and militia in mid-1999 had good reason 
to do so.  However it is also true that the residue of distrust is  typically difficult 
to overcome: as Gambetta has noted, “deep distrust is very difficult to invalidate 
through experience, for either it prevents people from engaging in the 
appropriate kind of social experiment or, worse, it leads to behaviour which 
bolsters the validity of distrust itself” (1998: 234). This suggests that missions 
that are not proactive, and that are incapable or unwilling of quickly 
demonstrating qualities of competent service and impartiality, will continue to 
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struggle against what is already a steep gradient in terms of building trust.  In 
our discussion below, we report on what our respondents have said about 
overcoming residual distrust.  
 
 
What would a trustworthy international policing mission look like? 
 
Jackson and Bradford (2010: 245) describe a trustworthy police force in the 
following terms: 
 
 [It] is seen by the public to be effective, to be fair, and to have shared 
values, interests, and a strong commitment to the local community…. 
Trust extents beyond narrow public assessments that police perform 
their duties effectively and efficiently to include a sense that the police 
understand the needs of the community, that they treat people fairly and 
with dignity, that they give them information, and that they allow 
members of the community a voice to highlight local problems. 
 
As we have seen, putting these ideas into practice is never easy – divided 
communities have long challenged the ideals of modern Western policing (eg 
Weitzer 1995 on Northern Ireland). It can be expected to be even harder in many 
international contexts, where unfamiliarity and differences of perspective 
amplify the underlying challenges of building a trustworthy police. While some 
indicators emerge from the general trust literature, establishing the conditions 
that encourage public trust in international policing missions requires further 
study. Our discussion to this point, and our research discussed below, constitute 
a modest start in this direction.  
 
3. The research 
In this section, we draw upon data collected from recorded interviews with more 
than 120 Australian police who served in peace-keeping and/or capacity-
building missions in the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea at 
some time in the period 2003-20072.  When the interview schedules were 
initially devised, the themes of trust and trust-building were not explicitly 
addressed or indeed anticipated by the research team. However later, upon 
examination of the transcripts, we observed that our respondents frequently 
referred to the concept of trust in relating their experiences with local police and 
local people during their deployment. It appeared integral to many respondents 
in terms of making sense of those experiences and in particular, the 
characteristics of the settings in which they had been tasked to perform 
peacekeeping and capacity-building roles. In what follows therefore, rather than 
offering an analysis of data collected with specific research objectives designed 
around themes relevant to trust, we use the material that emerged in suggestive 
ways to illuminate some of the themes of trust and trust-building as they affect 
                                                 
2
 To maintain confidentiality, participating officers are referred to only by interview number and 
location of mission/s. The authors acknowledge that further information such as length of service and 
rank (where applicable) would be interesting to readers; however we feel that inclusion of such 
information would make officers too easily identifiable. 
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international policing missions. We see a better understanding of trust from the 
perspective of the police personnel involved as important in terms of learning 
from these deployments in order to better prepare future personnel and also in 
deepening appreciation that the realisation of mission objectives is far more 
complex an achievement than simply “sending the right people properly 
equipped and with the right set of instructions on what to do.” Understandings of 
trust take us to the relational, non-technical aspects of international policing 
missions that have received little systematic attention from either policy-makers 
or researchers to date. 
 
The three countries covered by the research are small states close to Australia 
with GDP per  capita below USD1,400 (World Bank 2011) and low human 
development (UN 2011). Approximately even numbers of personnel had served 
in Timor-Leste (65) and Solomon Islands (68), with a smaller number (35) 
having served in Papua New Guinea (and 15 in other missions not addressed in 
the interviews). As will be evident from these totals, approximately half of the 
participants had served in more than one of these locations.  At the time of our 
interviews, Australian police postings in one location were approximately four 
months before being transferred elsewhere, though often within one mission, 
personnel might be moved several times. As our data reveals, this represents a 
challenge to building trustful relationships and the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) has moved to longer postings in these kinds of missions. 
 
The missions to these three nations were diverse in many ways.  For the 
purposes of this paper it is useful to point out, briefly, that Papua New Guinea 
hosted a short-lived (8 month) bilateral mission focused on police capacity 
building; Solomon Islands continues to host a multilateral mission established in 
2003 consisting of regional advisors, police and army forces working first to 
stabilise and then to build capacity in a range of fields including policing; and 
Timor-Leste has been host to a series of comprehensive United Nations missions, 
interspersed with stabilising missions under bilateral auspices, with police 
performing both in-line and capacity building functions.  
 
As might be expected, each of the settings in which our respondents served 
provided challenging contexts in which to work. The missions in Timor-Leste 
since 1999 followed a long and violent independence struggle, and institutions 
such as the police carried an association with Indonesian rule and thus 
community perceptions of prejudice and oppression (Kingsbury 2009).   As one 
Australian police officer we interviewed reflected that ‘some people … had a lot 
of anger, residual anger about the military and the police.  There was a 
perception of corruption and that’ (R23). Similarly, a key reason for the 
establishment of RAMSI in the Solomon Islands was the breakdown of law and 
order and the paralysis of the country’s government during the period 2000 to 
2003. Inevitably, this had resulted in severe compromises within the Royal 
Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) in terms of effectiveness, impartiality and 
legitimacy. Many of the police were identified with one ethnic grouping 
(Malaitans) during this period, so that member of other groups felt threatened by 
the police, even if they were not victimised, which many of them were. Hence it is 
not surprising that the difficulty of building public trust in these environments 
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was discussed by many of the Australian officers who served there and 
encountered the legacy of past policing experiences.  
 
4. Our respondents’ reflections on trust  
 
Local attitudes towards international policing missions 
 
In this part we discuss the willingness of local police and people , as seen through 
the eyes of our respondents,  to show trust to each other as well as to 
international policing personnel. What was clear from our data was that each of 
the settings considered could be regarded as low-trust settings afflicted by inter-
communal distrust and distrust of authorities, both local and international.  
 
For instance, a number of officers who served in the Solomon Islands reported to 
us that the community there had little trust for the local police at the outset of 
the mission, and that their first job was rebuilding this trust: ‘we were there to 
maintain a policing presence and also to help start to rebuild confidence in the 
police themselves’ (R24).  Knowing how to capitalise upon the high standing of 
international personnel in the early stages of interventions in ways that work 
towards, rather than against, restoring confidence in local police is a key issue 
facing missions seeking to build institutional trust. Recognising this low 
willingness to trust, many Australian police reported a proactive approach, in 
which ‘we encouraged people [police] to get out amongst it and regain the 
community’s appreciation and understanding through various strategic 
initiatives’ (R29). These tactics were directly towards trust among local police in 
the international missions :  
whilst on patrol if you were going past the hospital or through the markets, 
we would always have our windows down and … the kids would come up 
and jump on the side of the car.  If we had any left over ration packs we 
would – again it's only community policing – give them to the kids, the 
lollies, or have toys sent over and try to distribute those as equally as we 
could.  You know we did that to the orphanages as well.  We would always 
stop and chat to people, and again, just community policing.  Raising your 
profile, getting known, getting the trust, getting the respect of the people, 
and engaging them (R29). 
Putting a positive face to policing is surely desirable in these settings; however 
there is likely to be a significant gap between the levels of distrust that have been 
built up prior to the intervention and the likely returns of a ‘smiles and friendly’ 
approach by itself.  
 
One predictable obstacle international police can face is community distrust 
towards their local police. According to R43, in the Solomon Islands ‘the 
communities distrusted the RSIP.  If you were aligned with the RSIP, you 
automatically went into that basket, and they’d pull you aside and say “Why are 
you talking to Sergeant So and So?  He did this, this and this.  Why hasn’t he been 
locked up?”’ The possibility of this negative influence in large measure will be 
affected by the extent to which the reformed local police still resemble the 
previous police, one measure of which is the rehiring of police personnel from 
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the previous era. The limits of vetting procedures in terms of rooting out 
personnel with negative associations to the previous era have been apparent in 
the case of Timor-Leste as well. Where, as often will be the case, the international 
police do not control or cannot always veto those readmitted into the 
reconstituted local police forces, there will be consequences both for how the 
international police presence is regarded and the prospects for establishing a 
more trustworthy local police.  
 
As part of a reform push, there will be limits to what can be established in terms 
of trust between international and local police, especially those in the latter 
category who face vetting for readmission or who are subject to new methods 
and changes in the power distribution in the new arrangements. While there are 
signs in some quarters of an ‘international brotherhood’ developing among 
police from different countries (Deflem 2002), there are few signs of a ready 
affinity here.  Our data suggests that the extent of a ‘brotherhood’ developing 
across international policing missions and with local police remains limited, and 
the possibility of its achievement under mission conditions a moot point. As we 
have noted elsewhere (Goldsmith and Harris 2009), Australian police serving on 
multilateral peace-keeping missions in Timor-Leste did not always experience 
this anticipated support from other police forces, and this created a difficult 
working environment.  
 
Often, international police will have to contend with divisions within local police 
forces. Distrust among local police will often not be well understood in advance 
of deployments.  It will also affect relations between international and local 
police. Ethnic tensions within the local police in the Solomon Islands constituted 
a real difficulty, as described by R55: 
  
  you could sort of see the underlying mistrust between some of the police, you know, about 
the Guadis not trusting the Malaitians, but still working alongside them and having jokes with 
one another and – but you knew sort of deep down they probably didn’t really trust them, and 
some of them held resent from what had happened during the tensions, during the 2000 – 
when they had the murders and that  …  Now this person hadn’t been brought to justice, but 
they’re still working with them.  But I guess they knew that while the RAMSI’s there … it’s not 
going to blow up again…  [but] they didn’t really trust them, or they harboured this 
resentment  
 
In Timor-Leste, divisions emerged along ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ lines in 2005 
and 2006 within the police force as well as the military and other institutions of 
government, that proved to be highly destructive to mission goals of building 
public confidence in the local police and its ability to provide an effective, 
professional service to the people. In Papua New Guinea there were observed 
divisions between those who wanted change and those who did not. In short, the 
terrain for trust-building within local police forces is often fractious and 
contested, a fact that demands better preparation but that must also temper 
expectations around choice and realisation of mission goals.  
 
As a local police officer, there can be risks in being seen to be ‘too close’ to 
international personnel. Reformers always face risks when tackling the status 
quo, and international policing contexts prove to be no exception. As R45 
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reflected on the situation in Papua New Guinea, ‘probably one of my biggest 
concerns [was] what’s going to happen with those officers who had supported us 
[while we were there], when it was obvious that there were other officers out 
there running their own race and obviously … didn’t want us there and still 
continued to go about doing what they wanted to do even though we were there.’ 
While changes in administration usually produce some casualties, the 
uncertainty surrounding the length and success of international policing 
deployments means that local police officers will be taking major risks to 
themselves in aligning themselves too closely with mission personnel and 
objectives. Some will try to ‘play both sides of the street’ while many will practise 
forms of non-compliance or provide only limited cooperation. The answer to this 
dilemma, whatever it may be, clearly lies beyond the competence of individual 
international police personnel in particular relationships with local police. Ways 
of supporting local reform-inclined police will be needed that reduce the local 
risks they face. Securing local high-level endorsement for mission objectives 
methods is therefore likely to be crucial in the longer-term for allowing trust to 
develop.  
 
 
Trust-building with local police 
 
In this section, we consider the approaches Australian police took to building 
individual relationships in their work settings. Elsewhere in the development 
literature scholars have pointed to the critical role that relationships play in 
capacity building (see Girgis 2007; Kaplan 2000). One of our respondents,R5, 
echoed this, stating that ‘I just found myself being frustrated about [various] 
things and, of course, it's one thing to say that but then the other side of the 
equation is to actually capacity build people to think of those things as well, and 
before you can do that you have to relationship build so they'll at least work with 
you in doing the processes.’   
 
In their work to influence the practices of local police, Australian police adopted 
a range of tactics to demonstrate their trustworthiness.  Prime amongst these 
was ‘get[ting] your hands dirty’ (R54) – that is, showing that they were willing to 
do the work too.  This was particularly relevant in Papua New Guinea, where ‘we 
were supposed to be advisers.  We weren’t supposed to be helping them with all 
the paperwork,’ but as R24 discovered,   ‘we felt a bit guilty sitting on our arse 
doing nothing, so we helped start with some of the paperwork and that’s what 
helps form a better bond and friendship with our counterparts.  Because we 
were prepared to do some of the other work with them not just watch.’ Of 
course, as an example of a familiar paradox in capacity-building, by getting 
involved directly in police work as part of the process of building trust, the goal 
of building capacity at the local level risks being compromised. 
 
A variety of expectations around relationship building were revealed by the data. 
It is noteworthy that few respondents appeared to anticipate difficulties in 
setting up working relationships. It seemed to surprise many of the police we 
interviewed that they had to build relationships from the ground up with their 
local colleagues, and ‘show you’re worthy of respect’ (R53).  On the other hand, 
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several interviewees noted that they couldn’t assume that they started from a 
point of mutual respect. As R16 reflected, ‘You can’t be expected to win them 
over in a day because they’re very wary of you and the way you are.’  R6 
conceded that:  
there was a lot of resistance from the police at that police station in relation to the 
people coming in.  So it was about breaking down barriers initially you know.  And 
trying to get them all on side, the police we were working with, before we could 
actually start working with them … and the way to do that was to create 
friendships.  That is the way I saw it anyway.  It certainly wasn’t to go in there 
with a big stick and wave it around, it was to create an environment of trust.   
 
What trust-building meant to our respondents was not an issue we directly 
sought data on. However some indications emerged from our interviews. The 
importance of showing, and getting, respect, was mentioned by several 
respondents. ‘It goes back to that thing about gaining their respect, and they 
won’t tell you things unless they respect you’ (R40 SI). Such respect was seen as 
contributing to a personal desire amongst local police to change, with R55 
noting, ‘I think that when they see how you operate and like I say, if you’ve got 
their respect and their trust and they say “Oh yeah, that’s – I see why you did 
that” or they look up to you and they try and emulate you’.  It also created a 
relationship in which respectful critique could be given and responded to, in that 
‘you go in, look, listen, learn and once you get the relationship going then you 
might – then you’ll be able to offer some suggestions’ (R49). 
 
Hardly surprisingly, establishing workable relationships among police could 
often prove difficult. Just as the relationships with communities were fragile and 
changeable, relationships with police counterparts could be interrupted or 
derailed.  Here, the impact of short rotations was evident. As R73 pointed out, 
mistakes could be very costly in terms of achieving the desired capacity building 
outcomes:  
 Anyone can ride anyone out for fifteen weeks3.  If they don’t like you, they will just, 
they are a bit like snails, they will crawl back into their shell, sit and ride the storm 
out, when you leave, they pop their head out and think, ‘right I wonder if I will get on 
with the next guy?’  Understanding that and then coping and dealing with, you know. 
Making an effort to develop the relationship so that they don’t crawl into their shells 
and turn off while you are there and just ride you out, um is probably the biggest, 
connecting with them is probably the hardest thing. 
 
 
A distinction was drawn at times by our respondents between trust in the 
context of professional relationships and personal relationships. Indeed, the 
latter was seen by some respondents as a precondition for the former, at least in 
these settings where there is typically less inclination to draw or see a bright line 
between the two realms. Our respondents spoke of the importance of building 
personal relationships with the people with whom they work most closely.  In 
many mission environments, separating professional from personal 
relationships is not just difficult; it can appear to undermine mission objectives. 
This personal aspect included finding out about their families and communities, 
                                                 
3
 At the time of the interviews (2005-7), officers were generally deployed in three month rotations, 
followed by a one month break and redeployment to a different posting. 
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and acknowledging the cultural demands on them – as for example when culture 
would demand that an officer not confront a community member due to personal 
ties, which R21 addressed by giving local colleagues the opportunity to step 
down from particular cases where such conflict arose.  Equally important was 
taking a genuine personal interest in their colleagues – indeed, according to R29, 
‘you could not have anything but a personal relationship with the RSIP.  To try 
and keep a strictly professional arm’s length would not have worked.  They are a 
very personalised people.’   
 
Examples of this included the obvious approach of asking about their family 
members and their life outside work, as well as less obvious ones like helping a 
colleague to fill in bureaucratic paperwork needed to enable a family member to 
travel to Australia for a funeral (R5).  In fact, R54 noted that you build trust in 
Solomon Islands the same way ‘you do it anywhere else.  Guys you work with, 
drink with, you talk with, you socialise with …  [and] You don’t speak down to 
them.’   
 
Trying to deal with the blurring of the professional and the personal confronted 
some respondents with acute dilemmas from time to time. At these moments, the 
lack of convergence between local and mission values became vivid and a real 
obstacle to relationship building. This was particularly highlighted in situations 
whre Australian officers felt forced to choose between building trusting 
relationships with particular officers and compromising foundational Australian 
policing values. A vivid example of this was local police wanting to use police 
missions to gather food, for example by fishing from the police boat, or using 
police vehicles for personal purposes.  R46 explained some of the aspects of this 
dilemma as follows:  
 there are a lot of pressures on the police officers to [support their families 
and kinship groups], and how can you say no?  …  Like how do you say, no 
you can't bring your fish back for your starving family; you'll have to work 
out some other way.  It's just that, those things I found a little bit confronting 
at times because you have to try and keep the peace I suppose because if 
you said no, … they would probably just not have a good relationship with 
me any more, so you have to draw the line somewhere ...  It's very easy for 
us to say, but for the local police they could never understand why you took 
that stance.  
Learning how to juggle these circumstances is a real operational challenge for 
many international policing personnel. While there will often be no clear or at 
least easy answers to these dilemmas, this type of challenge suggests that more 
could be done to prepare international police to anticipate such challenges 
arising through cultural awareness training, ethical role-plays and other devices, 
and to provide them with a range of tactics for managing them. 
 
Having a significant personal relationship with local police could at times enable 
the assurance that internationally endorsed policing standards were not 
breached in particular circumstances by local police. R6, who served in Papua 
New Guinea, explained that once trust was established, there could be quite 
frank discussions about behavioural change:  
 there was [a philosophy] to shoot first and ask questions later and we would go to a 
specific task were there was a possibility that there would be shootings, so and I 
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would implore these guys, okay we are not to shoot unless they shoot at us, … [so]  
you would have to impress upon them the importance of not killing anybody 
especially while we were there because we would get the blame and you know if you 
had any respect for us, you wouldn’t do it and that’s were that friendship and trust 
and that built up to a point and they would go okay, well we are not going to kill 
anyone, we won’t shoot anyone because we don’t want you to get into trouble.  Not 
because they don’t want to do it, because they just didn’t want to get us into trouble 
so okay.  
 
The sustainability of such positive influences is obviously left open to question 
by this example. It points to the importance of building effective impersonal 
controls, as well as relying upon personal influence, if longer-term change is to be 
sustained and sustainable. Despite the difficulties they encountered, respondents 
stressed the importance of establishing trusting police-public and peer-peer 
relationships, and the benefits for both sides of working to achieve this.  R61 
described this situation aptly in terms of the peacekeeping function, stating that 
a key goal was for local people ‘to understand that it was safe again in their 
community.  They were not going to be subject to the terrorisation that they had 
been subject to by the militant groups, that they could walk the street safely, that 
they could have confidence again in the police.’  This quote is a reminder that the 
capacity to improve very basic requirements of living and social life remains 
fundamentally important as a means of establishing some trust or trust-like 
conditions, especially in the early stages of missions. 
 
 
Trust building with the local community 
 
Respondents attempted to break down distrust and scepticism locally by 
demonstrating that Australian police were friendly and trustworthy.  The 
reasons for building trust were practical as well as noble. Achieving a measure of 
trust, it was viewed, ‘encouraged informants, it encouraged community support, 
we could go to safety levels, we could get our people amongst the community 
safely, we could start identifying with honing down where the trouble spots were 
so it has a lot of strategic gains’ (R29).  It was well recognised that ‘engendering 
that confidence would then start to bring people back in to report crimes that we 
could then use to support our mission objectives about removing these key 
people’ (R61).   
 
Part of the trust agenda for international missions is building trust in local 
institutions. A clear example of this was publicly backing up local police.  This 
could mean confronting local power structures and customary hierarchical 
relationships in the community. R15 noted that ‘some of the local VIPs in the 
village areas didn't respect the young police officers at all   … in that these guys 
would be ranting and raving and waving their arms at us [but] we’d say, “no, 
we’re not going anywhere”, and that probably helped the local police a little bit, 
in that we weren’t intimidated whereas they might have been.’  As noted earlier, 
when local people are more inclined to seek and trust the services of 
international police personnel over those of local police, putting the local police 
forward in order to build their capacity may, for international police, mean 
incurring the wrath of local people.  
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The topic of vetting of recruits to the local police can generate difficulties in terms 
of local perceptions of the effectiveness and impartiality of international police 
involved in this important aspect of reconstruction and capacity-building. This 
can occur when prior vetting of new recruits has not been carried out, or has 
been done hastily and in an incomplete and ineffective manner.4 Senior UN 
Police officers interviewed by the first author in Timor-Leste  in late 2006 
expressed the view that the attempt by the government there to ‘stand up’ the 
PNTL after the 2006 crisis was proceeding  too quickly and that sometimes 
former senior PNTL officers were being ‘waved through’ without sufficient 
regard to their criminal actions during the crisis.  This knowledge held by 
international policing personnel, whether in the form of belief or corroborated 
fact, as R43’s observation above perhaps implies, seems likely to influence how 
police-police relationships are shaped and operate. Perceptions by international 
police of defective character among senior local police bode badly in terms of 
being able to establish positive interpersonal relationships and in terms of 
pursuing capacity-building objectives. 
 
Importantly, local policing practices also impacted on Australian police’s 
disposition towards their counterparts. Often respondents indicated that 
trusting them was difficult because of their habits and ways of doing police work. 
These issues are captured by an officer who had served on several missions: 
especially in Papua New Guinea and I noticed it more in East Timor, the 
people had a fear of the police.  In PNG … they [police] had no support from 
up top or anywhere.  There was just no guidance.  And they wouldn’t work 
so the people sort of had no respect for the police anyway, but they feared 
them because they knew that if they did the wrong they would get an 
absolute flogging.  What I noticed over the time was they were starting to 
lose their fear of the police while we were there because the people knew 
that while we were there the people wouldn’t get a flogging and I notice in 
East Timor, more to the point, the Australia and New Zealanders were sort 
of known to be soft, where the Portuguese that were there, knew - they - the 
locals knew that if they mucked up in front of them there would be a scene.  
(R17) 
This description echoes Mastrofski et al’s (2002) notion of a vicious cycle of 
reciprocal disrespect between police and policed in marginalised communities. It 
also highlights the reality that redressing such cycles is deeply complex.  As the 
previous quotation suggests, there can be a public safety dividend from the 
restraining co-presence of international police in such circumstances, but one 
that is ultimately conditional on their ongoing presence rather than any enduring 
change within the local police force. 
 
Apparent inconsistencies in how international police personnel are treated by 
local people and police can undermine confidence in the trustworthiness of 
                                                 
4
 It is very difficult to find extensive treatment of the police vetting issue in post-conflict settings in the 
policy or academic literatures. What occurs in practice too often reflects an international desire to 
restore local policing responsibility quickly, alongside an influential local interest in ensuring that 
favoured police are returned as soon as possible to the new institution, irrespective of their past 
misdeeds. As has been seen in Afghanistan and elsewhere, this can have fatal consequences for 
international police advisers as well as significant costs for others involved.  
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locals. Such perceptions often led international police to question their own 
methods as well as whether the mission goals were indeed appreciated or shared 
among the local population. This could justify a stance of caution and distrust on 
the part of international police personnel. Setbacks in the security situation 
perversely but somewhat understandably appeared to do significant damage to 
Australian police’s trust in the public.  R16 reflected that police had to remain on 
their guard and not assume that they had achieved positive relationships, stating 
that ‘In East Timor one minute, like, they’re changing your car tyre and the next 
minute they’re [throwing rocks at] you. So … you don't trust the people.’ This 
unpredictability or inconsistency could contribute to a stressful environment for 
officers who were used to being able to judge relationships and the dynamics of 
policing more accurately in Australia (Goldsmith 2009).  
 
Similarly, in the case of the large-scale civil disturbances in both the Solomon 
Islands and Timor in 2006, Australian police felt betrayed by the public, in that 
they were not informed of the pending unrest by any of their informants.  R29 
discussed this clearly, saying, 
The only difficulty came after the riots where you couldn’t cross the personal  
[inaudible] the major balance of society that was rioting and causing problems by 
stoning you and throwing machetes at you and so on and so forth.  So the problem 
was it was great up to the riots and a significant amount of respect and trust was 
lost post riots and you never knew who you trusted, therefore it took a long time 
to rebuild the confidence to trust locals, because during the riots you felt that 
everybody was against you. 
 
While feelings of betrayal and disappointment were evident, from a mission 
accomplishment and operational point of view, the question arises of how these 
feelings influence subsequent dealings with local police and members of the 
public. A robustness of attitude, informed by a tragic view of the possibilities of 
change in particular settings, would not seem inappropriate, and even could be 
seen as desirable or a necessary survival skill for overseas service. Muir (1983, 
7) describes the tragic view as “a philosophy which holds that good and bad 
inhere in each of us, that self-control is an important but not exclusive 
determinant of man’s fate, and that life is meaningful only if we give a damn 
about others, no matter how such concern hurts.” It is, Muir indicates, an 
antidote to the cynicism that too readily can emerge in police officers. Meeting 
local distrust with distrust from members of the mission seems certain to further 
undermine existing relationships and the pursuit of mission objectives. Our 
respondents, encouragingly, showed little evidence of any resentment impacting 
on their actions. In dealing with and building trust from the public, they arguably 
demonstrated both commitment and forbearance. Despite setbacks, they 
continued to work in this way – if perhaps more warily than before.  
 
Demonstrations of forbearance, as indicated by tolerance of differences of values 
and approaches, were evident in several of our respondents’ answers. Regarding 
Timor-Leste, R58 spoke of the persistent determination sometimes required to 
maintain this approach: 
I treat people with dignity and respect … so I don’t ever recall thinking “I’ll never 
get through to these people or whatever”, there were – of course there were 
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moments of frustration where I didn’t understand what was going on or things 
that they wanted were in conflict to things that I needed to do, but that’s just – 
you’ve just got to go with that.  You’ve just got to tolerate that.  That’s what 
missions are all about. You’re never going to get everything you want, it’s never 
going to happen in the time that you expect it to, and you just have to deal with the 
contingencies. 
A degree of fatalism (a tragic view) is evident in such remarks. An acceptance of 
difficulty in the job enables work to continue in part through making allowances 
for perceived shortcomings in the actions and attitudes of others.  
 
Finally, in terms of building trust with local police and local people, it should be 
noted that the very premises upon which international policing missions are 
undertaken lend themselves to making it difficult for international policing 
personnel to respect or trust local police and for local people to willingly trust 
either their own police or, at times, the international police. After all, it is due to a 
perceived breakdown in local security capacity or need for significant change 
that brings international police into these settings, yet very often, local 
expectations of international police are disappointed for various reasons 
including insufficient understanding of local circumstances and inadequate 
resources for dealing effectively with pressing problems. It is not surprising then 
that many international police will bring with them assumptions about the 
limited competence of local police as well as the fickleness of local people which 
can restrict demonstrations of respect towards counterparts and the community.  
 
Starting with the assumption that  local officers are generally incompetent, or 
that the majority of the local population can’t be trusted, amount to  obstacles to 
establishing trust. A willingness to trust presumptively indeed may be a 
prerequisite for securing trust in these circumstances. Against this idea, many of 
our respondents admitted to holding a generally negative perception of local 
capacity, identifying their particular counterparts as exceptions to this rule (see 
Harris 2010).  The fact that some respondents were able to distinguish their 
immediate counterparts from a more generalised negative assessment at least 
leaves open ways of working constructively with local counterparts. In future 
efforts to build interpersonal trust, further thought needs to be given to 
identifying and establishing forms of reciprocity of recognition between 
international and local people, so that differences that emerge in the life of 
missions can be managed positively rather than being assumed by one party to 
be indications of weakness by the other.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
[F]or us it was about re-establishing that community confidence.  It is getting them to 
understand that it was safe again in their community.  They were not going to be 
subject to the terrorisation that they had been subject to by the militant groups, that 
they could walk the street safely, that they could have confidence again in the police 
and engendering that confidence would then start to bring people back in to report 
crimes that we could then use to support our mission objectives about removing these 
key people (R61).   
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As this quotation indicates, ensuring conditions of public safety is fundamental to 
the enjoyment of individual freedom and cultural identity. Paradoxically, trust in 
police is often elusive when it is most needed in order to make restoration of 
public safety achievable. This paper has taken for granted the general value of 
there being trust in international policing mission settings between mission 
personnel, local police and people. Our data confirmed that this assumption was 
widely shared by our respondents. For them in general, it can be said,  
understandings of trust were crucial to how they approached their work and 
made sense of their experiences. Nonetheless, as the analysis of the data makes 
clear, often trust as a characteristic of interpersonal relationships and contacts is 
an ideal or an illusion, rather than a readily achievable objective under the 
conditions in which international policing missions are typically engaged.  
 
Given the difficulties of establishing trust, more attention is needed to the 
conditions that facilitate cooperation and collaboration between international 
policing personnel and local people and police.  In other words, identifying forms 
of positive engagement short of trusting relationships as well as steps on a path 
to building trust will prove important to improving how these missions work in 
particular settings in future. Here, collecting complementary data from local 
people and police is vital. In our study, we did not capture the views of those 
local police and members of the community with whom they had contact.  A 
more complete dataset would have sought to include their views in order to 
explore when trust is extended and what features of missions led to greater 
trustworthiness. It could also have made it possible to directly gauge the 
different kinds of motivational dispositions towards peacekeeping and capacity-
building objectives indicated in some of the recent literature (eg Braithwaite et al 
2007).  
 
More could be done to prepare international police personnel to anticipate the 
range of difficulties reported by our respondents, and to provide them with 
strategies for coping with them. We have seen that many respondents sought to 
build trust, yet were disappointed in what was achievable. Therefore, in 
preparing police personnel for future overseas deployments, efforts are needed 
to ensure that expectations in terms of local reception and cooperation are not 
unrealistically high. More preparation in terms of the difficulties of achieving 
quick change and indeed the changes favoured by international police – the 
tragic perspective – would be beneficial. Also, the inability to communicate with 
local people remains a common obstacle. Deficits in communicative competence 
work against practical accomplishments as well as normative convergence, both 
crucial to establishing trust.  
 
In short, rather on insisting on trust as a measure of achievement or as a 
necessary tool for making progress, there is a need for more realism. As noted, 
the instrumentalism seen in some local attitudes and actions should not be 
surprising. People habituated to distrusting others need material or at least 
tangible incentives if calculative trust is to emerge. This does not mean that other 
forms of trust cannot be developed over time. Changing values as well as 
practices will require a growing normative commitment among local police and 
local people if these changes are to be sustainable.  There are also likely to be 
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limits to how much reliance international personnel put on material incentives if 
an unhealthy, longer-term dependency is not to be created.  
 
Mission time-scales will continue to work against trust-building. There can be 
little doubt that short rotations work against establishing effective interpersonal 
trust, especially cognitive and normative trust. In addition to extending rotations 
(which Australia has done since our interviews), the process of building trust 
requires more  thinking about how to ensure more ‘quick wins’ and tangible 
improvements along the pathway of both peacekeeping and capacity-building. As 
noted, calculative sensibilities among those international policing personnel are 
working with have to be expected and managed effectively as part of giving effect 
to the relationships established. Establishing policing services to the most needy 
and vulnerable in ways responsive to their concerns must therefore be a priority 
‘on the ground’ as well as in mission policy objectives. 
 
Different means for dealing with distrust are also needed. International policing 
missions as well as the local institutions they are assisting need to subject 
themselves to a regulatory environment that is conducive to establishing trust. In 
short, institutional trust through accountability (eg an independent complaints 
authority) and measures of responsiveness (eg local level community safety 
committees) need to be established  publicly as part of the strategy of building 
trust more generally in police-community relations. Responding to distrust 
implies a number of other steps, including patience and forbearance, and a 
commitment from the beginning to negotiate expectations around the mission.  
 
In the end though, international policing missions engaged in peacekeeping and 
capacity-building will continue to take place in environments in which social 
disengagement from central government is commonplace, and in which broader 
social trust is scarce or non-existent. It is also the case, as we have seen, that 
failures at the strategic level (institutional trust) will inevitably impact upon 
operational achievements (interpersonal trust). Factors that impact upon the 
trustworthiness of government and political institutions generally, as well as the 
police in particular, will affect what can be achieved operationally in 
interpersonal trust in policing mission settings. Given these realities, there is 
relatively little that international policing missions can achieve by way of 
building trust and public confidence either quickly or by themselves. We need 
therefore to recognise the complexity of building trustworthy policing 
arrangements, important as they remain, and to avoid glib talk about trust until 
the challenges are better understood and begin to receive broader contextual 
support. Inevitably, the final responsibility for overcoming disengagement and 
defiance, and for building trustworthy police agencies, rests mainly with the 
local, national, regional, and international political systems and the communities 
in which they are located.  
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Trust, trustworthiness and trust-building in international 
policing missions1 
 
 
 
 
Andrew Goldsmith and Vandra Harris 
 
 
 
 
Trust is widely accepted as being central to domestic police effectiveness and 
legitimacy. It facilitates dealings between the public and the police, and eases 
relationships between the individuals within police services. In this article, we 
argue trust has an equally fundamental role in international policing missions, 
yet establishing trustworthy policing arrangements is even more difficult for a 
variety of reasons. We examine a number of these reasons here. The data used is 
drawn from interviews with Australian police on international deployment in 
Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea.  As the data from case 
studies indicate, international policing missions often take place in countries 
with low levels of public trust in the police. For many in these countries, 
international interventions can be matters of ambivalence or even induce active 
resistance and resentment. Finding ways of cooperating and collaborating, if 
not trusting, are fundamental to achieving international policing mission 
objectives. The article therefore considers some ways in which these missions 
may minimise distrust and earn trust. 
                                                 
1 The authors wish to thank Charles Hawksley and Gordon Peake and the anonymous reviewers for 
reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this paper. This research was funded under an Australian 
Research Council Linkage Grant LP0560643. For correspondence, please contact the firstnamed author 
at agoldsmi@uow.edu.au 
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 “It is one thing to walk in and everyone says, ‘G’day’ and shakes your hand 
and is all smiles, but it is another thing to have the trust of the people.” 
[R02] 
 
 “You would have to impress upon them the importance of not killing 
anybody especially while we were there because we would get the blame 
and you know if you had any respect for us, you wouldn’t do it and that’s 
where that friendship and trust and that built up “[R49] 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we explore everyday understandings of trust among police 
peacekeepers and capacity-builders in international police missions. These views 
inform how international police personnel approach their work in missions, 
including how they deal with local police counterparts and local people, and how 
they assess the effectiveness and relevance of what they do. As the objectives of 
these missions are typically quite ambitious (restoring peace and security; 
re/building reliable, effective local police forces etc), and often quite challenging 
at the local level in terms of securing consent and support for change, measures 
of trust and trustworthiness, we believe, provide insight into the processes by 
which local consent and commitment to the agendas of these missions are 
obtained or withheld.  As the two opening quotes from our interview-based 
study of Australian police personnel suggest, establishing trust, while often vital 
to building effective relationships, can prove elusive.  
 
International peacekeeping was founded upon the principles of impartiality, 
consent, and use of minimum force (Bellamy et al 2004: 96). In recent years 
peace mission mandates have changed, becoming more ambitious in scope and 
focusing more on intra-state conflicts. Police personnel have joined military and 
civilian personnel in what are sometimes referred to as ‘extension of state 
authority’ exercises (Jones et al 2010: 24). The role of international policing in 
the extension of state authority objectives has thus transformed the notion of 
policing in the past two decades from being an essentially domestic idea and 
practice to one of international political and social significance. However, this 
trend is not entirely new. The role of colonial and European police in matters of 
general administration and governance has been noted in studies of colonial 
policing and other policing systems (Dinnen and Braithwaite 2009; Neocleous 
2011). In this sense, there are undoubtedly points of continuity between the 
“export version” of Anglo-American policing and previously enacted models of 
Western policing.  It is not  surprising then that international policing missions 
share the principles of  impartiality, consent, and minimum force were also 
foundational principles of the Anglo-American model (Reiner 2010).  
 
Policing, like many other activities, benefits from cooperation and collaboration 
with other partners, including members of the community. Obtaining 
cooperation can be particularly difficult given the nature of police work. When 
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this challenge is transferred to a foreign context, the difficulties are greatly 
magnified. International policing missions frequently intervene in settings in 
which public trust in police agencies and personnel is historically low or absent – 
what can be considered “low-trust” settings (Fukuyama 1995; Goldsmith 2005). 
The absence of trust has been identified as one of the key challenges confronting 
modern peacekeeping operations. According to a recent report, there is “the 
need to build trust between key players in peacekeeping” (Parker 2010: 4). The 
report identifies the need to build trust “among the Security Council, Secretariat, 
troop, and financial contributing countries,” and describes this need as 
“fundamental, achievable, and necessary for effective peacekeeping” (Parker 
2010: 6). The absence of trust, as implied here, constitutes a limitation upon the 
level of cooperation and commitment among participating agencies that is 
needed to achieve strategic objectives (peace restoration; police reform etc.)  
 
In this paper, we take this point one further step, suggesting that the need to 
build trust is not limited to ‘key players’ in the sense of contributing countries 
and UN bodies. It is also of crucial importance to achieving strategic and tactical 
success in individual peace operations.  In this paper, we propose to explore a 
number of dimensions of the place of trust in international policing missions.  We 
accept the premise that generally policing is more benign and broadly acceptable 
if it is undertaken in a genuine trusting environment.  We also take the view that 
as international police peacekeeping is largely charged with restoring security on 
the ground and, increasingly, ensuring its maintenance over time, those who 
have experienced or who are experiencing insecurity and likely to be highly 
distrustful of international agencies and their staff need nonetheless to to be able 
to trust those agencies and their personnel  A critical question then is what 
conditions would permit an individual or society suffering from insecurity to 
trust an outside agency or its staff to help them?  In short, what facilitates the 
trustworthiness of that agency or individual?    
 
In section 2, we look at the literature on trust and draw upon that literature to 
sketch out some of the challenges of dealing with distrust and building trust that 
might arise in the context of international policing missions involved in 
peacekeeping and capacity-building tasks. In section 3, we outline the nature of 
the research undertaken with Australian police personnel who served on these 
missions which generated interview data from more than 120 interviews, In 
section 4, this data is drawn upon to extend the analysis, and in particular 
identify the ways in which trust was a meaningful concept in the work 
undertaken by these police officers. Section 5 concludes the discussion. 
 
2. Trusting International Policing Missions 
 
Trust, for different reasons, is problematic for international policing missions. 
One reason relates to the nature of policing and police work itself. Police officers 
typically trade in suspicion and distrust (Reiner 2010; 121-122); they are not 
inclined to be trusting. In the course of their daily work they must often 
challenge people in terms of what they are saying or doing; the police 
intervention may also result in a loss of liberty or privileges, risking the 
displeasure (or worse) of those deprived. Police work is also uncertain in its 
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aims and methods; it exhibits role ambiguity (Thomas 1998). As we will see 
below, that role ambiguity is even greater when its context is international 
rather than domestic. In most societies, as maintainers of order, police tend to 
clash more frequently with members of marginalised communities (Choong 
1997). Racial differences frequently are reflected in differentials of police 
treatment and public respect for the police (Smith 2010). Certain groups have 
suffered disproportionately from what is sometimes called over-policing and 
under-policing (OSJI 2009; Skogan 2006; Sharp and Johnson 2009).  Being the 
subject of too much police attention, or failing to obtain their services in 
moments of need, are negative perceptions that work against the establishment 
of trusting relationships. 
 
A second reason relates to the particular difficulties of working in foreign 
settings. As has been also noted in respect of international business 
relationships, unfamiliarity with local conditions and people tends to work 
against establishing ready trust (Brenkert 1998). International policing missions 
in this way resemble other kinds of international strategic alliances, requiring 
different forms of local cooperation and collaboration. “Trust may be expected to 
be particularly important in international collaborations, where the negative 
effects of cultural and physical distance are enhanced and the differences in 
political, social, and economic contexts may be large” (Zhang and Huxham 2009, 
187).   
 
Many mission environments can be classified as low-trust settings, measured in 
terms of interpersonal trust within the society in question, trust in government 
aind institutions, and willingness to trust outsiders (Goldsmith 2005). Often past 
colonial histories and previous experiences of regime-style policing, compound 
the difficulties international police personnel are likely to face in gaining the 
confidence of local people (Goldsmith 2003; Dinnen and Braithwaite 2009). 
Often the average person’s view will be of police individually and collectively as 
abusive, corrupt, or at best, indifferent to their security needs. In short, 
structural feature of these environments are likely to combine with cultural 
differences and situational factors to render the task of building trust with local 
communities and counterparts extremely difficult and perhaps impossible.  
Dealing with distrust, and building trust, will probably require a lot more than 
smiles from strangers bearing sweets for the local children. As Tankebe (2009: 
1281) noted in relation modern Ghana, “utilitarian factors [will be] important in 
shaping public cooperation with the police.” 
 
A third factor that works against ready trust is the circumstances in which the 
missions are launched and implemented. Many missions are interventions, 
whether they be mandated (say by the UN Security Council), or by agreement 
(sometimes called ‘cooperative interventions’).  Often as well, there are 
circumstances of emergency or urgent need that make the pace of intervention 
quick and therefore limited in terms of any opportunity to plan carefully, to 
negotiate in advance with affected parties, or to establish clear and shared 
objectives. Whether the primary mission focus is peacekeeping or capacity-
building, the fact remains that the interventions are premised upon some kind of 
inequality between the interveners and the intervenees. It is due to the ascribed 
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superiority of the mission in its ability to restore order or re/build local police 
forces that the mission is present. This inequality is reinforced over time as the 
superior capacity of the mission in terms of resources and knowledge is 
demonstrated during the life of the mission.   
 
A failure to negotiate objectives and priorities with local police, and blindness to 
the persistence of differences of expectations, can result in a lack of local support 
(Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007). While adequate planning around objectives and 
collaborative mechanisms at the start is fundamental in building trust, how 
international personnel then conduct themselves in mission is crucial, and 
potentially highly destructive of public confidence and trust. As trust implies 
vulnerability (Montgomery 2008), the excesses or abuses of one party can be 
extremely damaging to the willingness to trust of the other. Even single acts that 
violate local expectations can do substantial damage to international trust-
building agendas. If international police personnel become involved in 
corruption or sexual exploitation of local people, as has happened on numerous 
occasions within some UN missions, this can attract negative publicity and local 
public resentment (Odello 2010). Equally if police fail to restore order promptly 
after a period of societal conflict, public expectations can be disappointed and 
result in greater social distance between the international police and local 
people. 
 
 
Trust and Trust-building 
 
Some general observations can be made about trust with application to 
international policing missions.  
 
Firstly, for the most part, the data discussed here, derived from interviews 
focusing upon dealings with other individuals, addresses interpersonal rather 
than institutional trust. However, these concepts are interrelated and both are 
important from the point of view of meeting the objectives of international 
policing missions. The relationship between the two is visible in a number of 
ways. Individual incompetence, for example, can undermine trust in institutions 
(Thomas 1998). In other words, a police officer who abuses her power can 
negatively impact upon public perceptions of the organization to which she 
belongs. On the other hand, there are studies to suggest quite strongly, as one 
might expect and indeed hope as a member of an international policing mission, 
that building interpersonal trust locally can contribute to building institutional 
trust on a wider basis (Tranter and Skrbis 2009). More work is needed to 
establish under a variety of conditions which measures of interpersonal trust can 
contribute to trust-building in institutions. However, a recent study among 
young people in Queensland (Tranter and Skrbis 2009) indicated that having 
trust in teachers tended to increase institutional trust not just in schools but in 
other institutions as well, including police, television, and politicians. This 
finding is certainly consistent with the idea that trust, and more particularly 
distrust, is often generalised across a range of institutions and settings 
(Gambetta 1988). For present purposes, while much still remains uncharted in 
terms of the interrelationship between interpersonal and institutional trust, 
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there is adequate evidence of the importance of dealing with interpersonal trust 
(and distrust) as part of any strategy for improving trust in public institutions.  
 
Secondly, people and cultures differ in terms of their willingness to trust. Some 
cultures for intrinsic or extrinsic reasons may be less inclined to trust outsiders 
than others (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995). This variability in willingness to 
trust will impact differentially in terms of a mission’s ability to build trust. Then,  
trust is relational in character; it only exists when there is an actual or potential 
relationship between two or more parties.  Trust will therefore be influenced in 
part by the position and attitude of the parties to a particular relationship.  If 
there is actual or perceived imbalance or inequality, that factor can be expected 
to impact upon the capacity for trust to emerge, and the kinds of relationships 
that are possible. Power imbalances are not always sufficiently recognised by 
interveners, and need to be managed as part of any trust-building exercise 
(Vangen and Huxham 2003). Where there is no previous relationship, 
establishing trust will require providing reasons for entering a collaboration or 
providing cooperation. Establishing and meeting local expectations in tangible 
ways is widely seen as important to taking the first steps towards establishing 
trust. In other words, successful collaborations will provide a basis for the 
emergence of trust (Vangen and Huxham 2003). 
 
It is also important to recognise the association between trust and risk and 
vulnerability. Trust is crucial to enhancing feelings of insecurity. Misztal (1996: 
102) describes trust as “a protective mechanism relying on everyday routines, 
stable reputations and tacit memories, which together push out of modern life 
fear and uncertainty as well as moral problems”.  Similarly Luhmann has 
described trust as a “solution for specific problems of risk” (1988: 95). In these 
pithy definitions, we can recognise the pertinence of trust to the challenges 
facing international policing. Paradoxically though,  trust itself can also serve as a 
precondition to taking risks; only when people are confident of their relative 
safety will they be prepared to undertake certain risky activities. As effecting 
change is common to both international peacekeeping and capacity-building 
missions, recognising local feelings of vulnerability on each issue is fundamental 
to effective trust-building.  Sensitivity to past negative experiences at the local 
level is required: 
 
 Where people have little history together, or an erratic history of 
cooperation mixed with exploitation, or a consistent history of failure to 
cooperate, people will distrust one another, avoiding collaborative 
endeavours without guarantees on the other’s behaviour (Burt 2001, 33) 
 
 
In terms of being worthy of trust (ie trustworthy), there is considerable 
consensus about the qualities of an individual or organisation that facilitate 
trustworthiness. The three most commonly mentioned are:  competence, 
impartiality, and beneficence (Montgomery et al 1998). The first refers to having 
the relevant skills and capability to assist; the second refers to a lack of bias and 
a willingness to follow a principled approach to providing assistance, while the 
third quality refers to acting towards the other person with a view to assisting, 
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rather than harming, them. Where one or more of these qualities is seen to be 
lacking or missing in an individual or an institution, there will be a reluctance to 
cooperate or collaborate, making the establishment of trust difficult.   
 
Different kinds of , or bases for, trust, need to be considered. Some policing 
scholars have pointed to motive-based trust.  This “turns on whether the police 
are seen as having the best interests of the community at heart’ (Jackson and 
Bradford 2010: 245).  International missions face many difficulties under this 
standard. They have to be able first to know what those ‘best interests’ are. This 
may be no easy matter in the circumstances faced by international policing 
missions, especially since in the presence of recent conflict there may be many 
divisions over what this might mean.  Furthermore, there are the vexed issues of 
whether the mission has the mandate and capacity to respond effectively, and 
more critically, whether it will be appropriate to do so in volatile circumstances. 
Local divisions within the community, and distrust of outsiders, will mean that 
showing a commitment to ‘the community’ will often not be easy. 
 
Another basis for trust has been linked to procedural justice. On this perspective, 
it is suggested that trust in legal authorities (including police) can emerge from 
fair and respectful processes, independently (under some conditions at least) of 
the particular substantive outcomes achieved (Tyler 1990; Hough et al 2010). In 
other words, treating people fairly can contribute to feelings of trust and 
confidence in police and other legal authorities; even if the party in question 
does not get the substantive result he or she was seeking. This approach 
endorses the value of normative commitment (or cooperation) over 
instrumental (calculative) cooperation.  However, in relation to policing minority 
communities (Cherney and Murphy 2011) and national communities deeply 
distrustful of police (Tankebe 2009), where past histories have given little cause 
for confidence in future different relations between police and these 
communities, it is far from clear that procedural justice alone can work to build 
trust and confidence in policing.  
 
Finally, in terms of building or establishing trust, it may  be useful to draw on the 
work of Lane (1998) to distinguish between calculative, cognitive, and normative 
trust. In effect, this scheme presents three different kinds of trust that might be 
‘built.’ Calculative trust is trust based upon a calculation of costs and benefits of 
particular courses of action. Costs here include the possibility of deterrence and 
damage to the reputation of parties. As Child notes (1998: 245), this form of trust 
is particularly apt in the context of new relationships, and to the formation of 
new international strategic alliances.  
 
Over time, common ways of thinking may emerge, allowing parties to predict the 
actions of the other. This is cognitive trust, a sharing of cognitions. Sometimes 
referred to as knowledge-based trust, it relies on information rather than 
deterrence. This is a luxury infrequently afforded in the context of most 
international policing missions, especially at the interpersonal level, where 
duration of engagements is typically short, often as little as a few weeks or 
several months.  The third, normative trust, “depends on people sharing common 
values, including a common concept of moral obligation” (Child: 1998: 245). It 
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resembles what some scholars call identification-based trust, in which there is a 
high degree of mutual understanding of each other’s wants. Again, the 
constraints of policing missions make this kind of trust difficult to establish. 
 
A fourth kind, affective trust, is sometimes mentioned in the trust literature. This 
is based upon emotional ties between people. These are usually built up over 
time on the basis of effective communication. As Child notes (1998: 246), this 
kind of trust can be expected rarely in international strategic alliances given 
issues such as different backgrounds and languages, and the risk of competing 
objectives.  
 
 
International Strategic Alliances and Institutional Trust 
 
In terms of institutional settings for international policing missions, there are 
useful parallels in seeing these missions as involved in forms of international 
strategic alliances (ISAs). Both missions and international business ventures 
share in common the fact that they are inter-agency cooperative arrangements 
“aimed at pursuing mutual strategic objectives” (Das and Teng 2000: 77).  Das 
and Kumar (2000; 2009) look at these arrangements in terms of the presence or 
absence of commitment and forbearance, the two essential elements of successful 
inter-partner harmony.  The former refers to the degree of interdependency 
established in the pursuit of shared goals, while the latter relates to “the ever-
present need to be restrained, patient, and open-minded in circumstances 
involving actual or perceived incompatibility of the member firms’ actions with 
expected norms of behaviour” (Das and Kumar 2009:38). The issues of patience 
between mission partners and the shaky nature of shared commitments is one 
explored in our data below. 
 
In general terms, ISAs face two challenges. The first is ensuring that there are, in 
fact, mutual strategic objectives, which in conflict-torn environments can be 
difficult. As noted earlier, this aspect is often given insufficient attention in the 
early stages. The second is the fact that the assumptions about “what can be 
taken for granted” within the alliance are likely to be different, rather than 
shared (Child 1998, 243). Identifying, and preserving, common goals can be 
difficult, as we have noted already. In policing as in business,  tendencies to 
compete (or at least resist) exist alongside tendencies to cooperate, and can 
often undermine trust-building.  In business, such alliances tend to be unstable 
and to fail (Das and Teng 2000).  The same can be noted about many previous 
international peacekeeping and capacity-building initiatives (Chesterman 2004; 
Jones et al 2010).  Studying what makes international strategic alliances in 
general effective may then pay dividends for international peacekeeping 
missions. 
 
 
Falling Short of Trust 
 
For many reasons then, international policing missions will find themselves in 
environments in which, at best, trust in them as individuals as well as the 
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mission level, is in short supply. This reality poses, as has been already 
mentioned, the challenge of how, over time, to build trust where it is not present. 
It also poses questions about dealing with distrust that is preventing improved 
policing and security from being established (see Goldsmith 2005).  Both these 
goals may take time, or indeed never be achieved in the time available. Early on 
in missions then, proxies for trust will often be necessary in order to make 
changes. In extreme life-threatening circumstances (eg humanitarian disasters, 
ongoing major violence), people at risk may have to ‘trust’ outsiders because 
they feel they have little option (Montgomery et al 2008).  Under a variety of 
circumstances of conflict and ignorance, cooperation and compliance therefore 
can occur without real trust. Commitment over a longer term however is a more 
difficult accomplishment that may be less responsive to material inducements or 
emergency provisions.  
 
In the present context, it seems useful to consider a number of ‘motivational 
postures’ that can be displayed towards those seeking trust or at least 
compliance or cooperation (Braithwaite et al 2007). As the prevalence of distrust 
or at least an absence of trust would suggest, a variety of stances short of trusting 
cooperation with international policing personnel must be anticipated. In 
addition to defiance, forms of game playing, resistance, disengagement, 
cooperation and capitulation can be expected in certain circumstances.  Many of 
the challenges experienced by our respondents can be interpreted in terms of 
these different postures.   
 
In addition, the wider trajectory of particular missions can be seen often in terms 
of a shifting menu of different postures displayed by local politicians, police and 
members of the community. Over time, one could expect the same people to 
display different dispositions in some cases (though, some may remain fixed), 
while different segments will be more predisposed to trust than others.  As our 
data discussion below will confirm, much remains unknown regarding how 
dispositions of defiance and disengagement can be moved in the direction of 
cooperation and commitment in the contexts we are concerned with here. As 
seen in other areas of international development and security sector reform, the 
“quick wins” approach - in the sense of “providing immediately tangible benefits 
to the population” – in order to “impact positively upon formal and informal 
political dynamics at all levels” (Stabilisation Unit 2009) suggests that calculative 
approaches are probably inevitable at the start of most international policing 
missions as well.  
 
In terms of dealing with distrust, it must be remembered that distrust is not 
always a bad thing. It can indeed often make sense. The East Timorese who hid in 
the jungles from the Indonesian police and militia in mid-1999 had good reason 
to do so.  However it is also true that the residue of distrust is  typically difficult 
to overcome: as Gambetta has noted, “deep distrust is very difficult to invalidate 
through experience, for either it prevents people from engaging in the 
appropriate kind of social experiment or, worse, it leads to behaviour which 
bolsters the validity of distrust itself” (1998: 234). This suggests that missions 
that are not proactive, and that are incapable or unwilling of quickly 
demonstrating qualities of competent service and impartiality, will continue to 
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struggle against what is already a steep gradient in terms of building trust.  In 
our discussion below, we report on what our respondents have said about 
overcoming residual distrust.  
 
 
What would a trustworthy international policing mission look like? 
 
Jackson and Bradford (2010: 245) describe a trustworthy police force in the 
following terms: 
 
 [It] is seen by the public to be effective, to be fair, and to have shared 
values, interests, and a strong commitment to the local community…. 
Trust extents beyond narrow public assessments that police perform 
their duties effectively and efficiently to include a sense that the police 
understand the needs of the community, that they treat people fairly and 
with dignity, that they give them information, and that they allow 
members of the community a voice to highlight local problems. 
 
As we have seen, putting these ideas into practice is never easy – divided 
communities have long challenged the ideals of modern Western policing (eg 
Weitzer 1995 on Northern Ireland). It can be expected to be even harder in many 
international contexts, where unfamiliarity and differences of perspective 
amplify the underlying challenges of building a trustworthy police. While some 
indicators emerge from the general trust literature, establishing the conditions 
that encourage public trust in international policing missions requires further 
study. Our discussion to this point, and our research discussed below, constitute 
a modest start in this direction.  
 
3. The research 
In this section, we draw upon data collected from recorded interviews with more 
than 120 Australian police who served in peace-keeping and/or capacity-
building missions in the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea at 
some time in the period 2003-20072.  When the interview schedules were 
initially devised, the themes of trust and trust-building were not explicitly 
addressed or indeed anticipated by the research team. However later, upon 
examination of the transcripts, we observed that our respondents frequently 
referred to the concept of trust in relating their experiences with local police and 
local people during their deployment. It appeared integral to many respondents 
in terms of making sense of those experiences and in particular, the 
characteristics of the settings in which they had been tasked to perform 
peacekeeping and capacity-building roles. In what follows therefore, rather than 
offering an analysis of data collected with specific research objectives designed 
around themes relevant to trust, we use the material that emerged in suggestive 
ways to illuminate some of the themes of trust and trust-building as they affect 
                                                 
2 To maintain confidentiality, participating officers are referred to only by interview number and 
location of mission/s. The authors acknowledge that further information such as length of service and 
rank (where applicable) would be interesting to readers; however we feel that inclusion of such 
information would make officers too easily identifiable. 
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international policing missions. We see a better understanding of trust from the 
perspective of the police personnel involved as important in terms of learning 
from these deployments in order to better prepare future personnel and also in 
deepening appreciation that the realisation of mission objectives is far more 
complex an achievement than simply “sending the right people properly 
equipped and with the right set of instructions on what to do.” Understandings of 
trust take us to the relational, non-technical aspects of international policing 
missions that have received little systematic attention from either policy-makers 
or researchers to date. 
 
The three countries covered by the research are small states close to Australia 
with GDP per  capita below USD1,400 (World Bank 2011) and low human 
development (UN 2011). Approximately even numbers of personnel had served 
in Timor-Leste (65) and Solomon Islands (68), with a smaller number (35) 
having served in Papua New Guinea (and 15 in other missions not addressed in 
the interviews). As will be evident from these totals, approximately half of the 
participants had served in more than one of these locations.  At the time of our 
interviews, Australian police postings in one location were approximately four 
months before being transferred elsewhere, though often within one mission, 
personnel might be moved several times. As our data reveals, this represents a 
challenge to building trustful relationships and the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) has moved to longer postings in these kinds of missions. 
 
The missions to these three nations were diverse in many ways.  For the 
purposes of this paper it is useful to point out, briefly, that Papua New Guinea 
hosted a short-lived (8 month) bilateral mission focused on police capacity 
building; Solomon Islands continues to host a multilateral mission established in 
2003 consisting of regional advisors, police and army forces working first to 
stabilise and then to build capacity in a range of fields including policing; and 
Timor-Leste has been host to a series of comprehensive United Nations missions, 
interspersed with stabilising missions under bilateral auspices, with police 
performing both in-line and capacity building functions.  
 
As might be expected, each of the settings in which our respondents served 
provided challenging contexts in which to work. The missions in Timor-Leste 
since 1999 followed a long and violent independence struggle, and institutions 
such as the police carried an association with Indonesian rule and thus 
community perceptions of prejudice and oppression (Kingsbury 2009).   As one 
Australian police officer we interviewed reflected that ‘some people … had a lot 
of anger, residual anger about the military and the police.  There was a 
perception of corruption and that’ (R23). Similarly, a key reason for the 
establishment of RAMSI in the Solomon Islands was the breakdown of law and 
order and the paralysis of the country’s government during the period 2000 to 
2003. Inevitably, this had resulted in severe compromises within the Royal 
Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) in terms of effectiveness, impartiality and 
legitimacy. Many of the police were identified with one ethnic grouping 
(Malaitans) during this period, so that member of other groups felt threatened by 
the police, even if they were not victimised, which many of them were. Hence it is 
not surprising that the difficulty of building public trust in these environments 
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was discussed by many of the Australian officers who served there and 
encountered the legacy of past policing experiences.  
 
4. Our respondents’ reflections on trust  
 
Local attitudes towards international policing missions 
 
In this part we discuss the willingness of local police and people , as seen through 
the eyes of our respondents,  to show trust to each other as well as to 
international policing personnel. What was clear from our data was that each of 
the settings considered could be regarded as low-trust settings afflicted by inter-
communal distrust and distrust of authorities, both local and international.  
 
For instance, a number of officers who served in the Solomon Islands reported to 
us that the community there had little trust for the local police at the outset of 
the mission, and that their first job was rebuilding this trust: ‘we were there to 
maintain a policing presence and also to help start to rebuild confidence in the 
police themselves’ (R24).  Knowing how to capitalise upon the high standing of 
international personnel in the early stages of interventions in ways that work 
towards, rather than against, restoring confidence in local police is a key issue 
facing missions seeking to build institutional trust. Recognising this low 
willingness to trust, many Australian police reported a proactive approach, in 
which ‘we encouraged people [police] to get out amongst it and regain the 
community’s appreciation and understanding through various strategic 
initiatives’ (R29). These tactics were directly towards trust among local police in 
the international missions :  
whilst on patrol if you were going past the hospital or through the markets, 
we would always have our windows down and … the kids would come up 
and jump on the side of the car.  If we had any left over ration packs we 
would – again it's only community policing – give them to the kids, the 
lollies, or have toys sent over and try to distribute those as equally as we 
could.  You know we did that to the orphanages as well.  We would always 
stop and chat to people, and again, just community policing.  Raising your 
profile, getting known, getting the trust, getting the respect of the people, 
and engaging them (R29). 
Putting a positive face to policing is surely desirable in these settings; however 
there is likely to be a significant gap between the levels of distrust that have been 
built up prior to the intervention and the likely returns of a ‘smiles and friendly’ 
approach by itself.  
 
One predictable obstacle international police can face is community distrust 
towards their local police. According to R43, in the Solomon Islands ‘the 
communities distrusted the RSIP.  If you were aligned with the RSIP, you 
automatically went into that basket, and they’d pull you aside and say “Why are 
you talking to Sergeant So and So?  He did this, this and this.  Why hasn’t he been 
locked up?”’ The possibility of this negative influence in large measure will be 
affected by the extent to which the reformed local police still resemble the 
previous police, one measure of which is the rehiring of police personnel from 
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the previous era. The limits of vetting procedures in terms of rooting out 
personnel with negative associations to the previous era have been apparent in 
the case of Timor-Leste as well. Where, as often will be the case, the international 
police do not control or cannot always veto those readmitted into the 
reconstituted local police forces, there will be consequences both for how the 
international police presence is regarded and the prospects for establishing a 
more trustworthy local police.  
 
As part of a reform push, there will be limits to what can be established in terms 
of trust between international and local police, especially those in the latter 
category who face vetting for readmission or who are subject to new methods 
and changes in the power distribution in the new arrangements. While there are 
signs in some quarters of an ‘international brotherhood’ developing among 
police from different countries (Deflem 2002), there are few signs of a ready 
affinity here.  Our data suggests that the extent of a ‘brotherhood’ developing 
across international policing missions and with local police remains limited, and 
the possibility of its achievement under mission conditions a moot point. As we 
have noted elsewhere (Goldsmith and Harris 2009), Australian police serving on 
multilateral peace-keeping missions in Timor-Leste did not always experience 
this anticipated support from other police forces, and this created a difficult 
working environment.  
 
Often, international police will have to contend with divisions within local police 
forces. Distrust among local police will often not be well understood in advance 
of deployments.  It will also affect relations between international and local 
police. Ethnic tensions within the local police in the Solomon Islands constituted 
a real difficulty, as described by R55: 
  
  you could sort of see the underlying mistrust between some of the police, you know, about 
the Guadis not trusting the Malaitians, but still working alongside them and having jokes with 
one another and – but you knew sort of deep down they probably didn’t really trust them, and 
some of them held resent from what had happened during the tensions, during the 2000 – 
when they had the murders and that  …  Now this person hadn’t been brought to justice, but 
they’re still working with them.  But I guess they knew that while the RAMSI’s there … it’s not 
going to blow up again…  [but] they didn’t really trust them, or they harboured this 
resentment  
 
In Timor-Leste, divisions emerged along ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ lines in 2005 
and 2006 within the police force as well as the military and other institutions of 
government, that proved to be highly destructive to mission goals of building 
public confidence in the local police and its ability to provide an effective, 
professional service to the people. In Papua New Guinea there were observed 
divisions between those who wanted change and those who did not. In short, the 
terrain for trust-building within local police forces is often fractious and 
contested, a fact that demands better preparation but that must also temper 
expectations around choice and realisation of mission goals.  
 
As a local police officer, there can be risks in being seen to be ‘too close’ to 
international personnel. Reformers always face risks when tackling the status 
quo, and international policing contexts prove to be no exception. As R45 
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reflected on the situation in Papua New Guinea, ‘probably one of my biggest 
concerns [was] what’s going to happen with those officers who had supported us 
[while we were there], when it was obvious that there were other officers out 
there running their own race and obviously … didn’t want us there and still 
continued to go about doing what they wanted to do even though we were there.’ 
While changes in administration usually produce some casualties, the 
uncertainty surrounding the length and success of international policing 
deployments means that local police officers will be taking major risks to 
themselves in aligning themselves too closely with mission personnel and 
objectives. Some will try to ‘play both sides of the street’ while many will practise 
forms of non-compliance or provide only limited cooperation. The answer to this 
dilemma, whatever it may be, clearly lies beyond the competence of individual 
international police personnel in particular relationships with local police. Ways 
of supporting local reform-inclined police will be needed that reduce the local 
risks they face. Securing local high-level endorsement for mission objectives 
methods is therefore likely to be crucial in the longer-term for allowing trust to 
develop.  
 
 
Trust-building with local police 
 
In this section, we consider the approaches Australian police took to building 
individual relationships in their work settings. Elsewhere in the development 
literature scholars have pointed to the critical role that relationships play in 
capacity building (see Girgis 2007; Kaplan 2000). One of our respondents,R5, 
echoed this, stating that ‘I just found myself being frustrated about [various] 
things and, of course, it's one thing to say that but then the other side of the 
equation is to actually capacity build people to think of those things as well, and 
before you can do that you have to relationship build so they'll at least work with 
you in doing the processes.’   
 
In their work to influence the practices of local police, Australian police adopted 
a range of tactics to demonstrate their trustworthiness.  Prime amongst these 
was ‘get[ting] your hands dirty’ (R54) – that is, showing that they were willing to 
do the work too.  This was particularly relevant in Papua New Guinea, where ‘we 
were supposed to be advisers.  We weren’t supposed to be helping them with all 
the paperwork,’ but as R24 discovered,   ‘we felt a bit guilty sitting on our arse 
doing nothing, so we helped start with some of the paperwork and that’s what 
helps form a better bond and friendship with our counterparts.  Because we 
were prepared to do some of the other work with them not just watch.’ Of 
course, as an example of a familiar paradox in capacity-building, by getting 
involved directly in police work as part of the process of building trust, the goal 
of building capacity at the local level risks being compromised. 
 
A variety of expectations around relationship building were revealed by the data. 
It is noteworthy that few respondents appeared to anticipate difficulties in 
setting up working relationships. It seemed to surprise many of the police we 
interviewed that they had to build relationships from the ground up with their 
local colleagues, and ‘show you’re worthy of respect’ (R53).  On the other hand, 
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several interviewees noted that they couldn’t assume that they started from a 
point of mutual respect. As R16 reflected, ‘You can’t be expected to win them 
over in a day because they’re very wary of you and the way you are.’  R6 
conceded that:  
there was a lot of resistance from the police at that police station in relation to the 
people coming in.  So it was about breaking down barriers initially you know.  And 
trying to get them all on side, the police we were working with, before we could 
actually start working with them … and the way to do that was to create 
friendships.  That is the way I saw it anyway.  It certainly wasn’t to go in there 
with a big stick and wave it around, it was to create an environment of trust.   
 
What trust-building meant to our respondents was not an issue we directly 
sought data on. However some indications emerged from our interviews. The 
importance of showing, and getting, respect, was mentioned by several 
respondents. ‘It goes back to that thing about gaining their respect, and they 
won’t tell you things unless they respect you’ (R40 SI). Such respect was seen as 
contributing to a personal desire amongst local police to change, with R55 
noting, ‘I think that when they see how you operate and like I say, if you’ve got 
their respect and their trust and they say “Oh yeah, that’s – I see why you did 
that” or they look up to you and they try and emulate you’.  It also created a 
relationship in which respectful critique could be given and responded to, in that 
‘you go in, look, listen, learn and once you get the relationship going then you 
might – then you’ll be able to offer some suggestions’ (R49). 
 
Hardly surprisingly, establishing workable relationships among police could 
often prove difficult. Just as the relationships with communities were fragile and 
changeable, relationships with police counterparts could be interrupted or 
derailed.  Here, the impact of short rotations was evident. As R73 pointed out, 
mistakes could be very costly in terms of achieving the desired capacity building 
outcomes:  
 Anyone can ride anyone out for fifteen weeks3.  If they don’t like you, they will just, 
they are a bit like snails, they will crawl back into their shell, sit and ride the storm 
out, when you leave, they pop their head out and think, ‘right I wonder if I will get on 
with the next guy?’  Understanding that and then coping and dealing with, you know. 
Making an effort to develop the relationship so that they don’t crawl into their shells 
and turn off while you are there and just ride you out, um is probably the biggest, 
connecting with them is probably the hardest thing. 
 
 
A distinction was drawn at times by our respondents between trust in the 
context of professional relationships and personal relationships. Indeed, the 
latter was seen by some respondents as a precondition for the former, at least in 
these settings where there is typically less inclination to draw or see a bright line 
between the two realms. Our respondents spoke of the importance of building 
personal relationships with the people with whom they work most closely.  In 
many mission environments, separating professional from personal 
relationships is not just difficult; it can appear to undermine mission objectives. 
This personal aspect included finding out about their families and communities, 
                                                 
3 At the time of the interviews (2005-7), officers were generally deployed in three month rotations, 
followed by a one month break and redeployment to a different posting. 
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and acknowledging the cultural demands on them – as for example when culture 
would demand that an officer not confront a community member due to personal 
ties, which R21 addressed by giving local colleagues the opportunity to step 
down from particular cases where such conflict arose.  Equally important was 
taking a genuine personal interest in their colleagues – indeed, according to R29, 
‘you could not have anything but a personal relationship with the RSIP.  To try 
and keep a strictly professional arm’s length would not have worked.  They are a 
very personalised people.’   
 
Examples of this included the obvious approach of asking about their family 
members and their life outside work, as well as less obvious ones like helping a 
colleague to fill in bureaucratic paperwork needed to enable a family member to 
travel to Australia for a funeral (R5).  In fact, R54 noted that you build trust in 
Solomon Islands the same way ‘you do it anywhere else.  Guys you work with, 
drink with, you talk with, you socialise with …  [and] You don’t speak down to 
them.’   
 
Trying to deal with the blurring of the professional and the personal confronted 
some respondents with acute dilemmas from time to time. At these moments, the 
lack of convergence between local and mission values became vivid and a real 
obstacle to relationship building. This was particularly highlighted in situations 
whre Australian officers felt forced to choose between building trusting 
relationships with particular officers and compromising foundational Australian 
policing values. A vivid example of this was local police wanting to use police 
missions to gather food, for example by fishing from the police boat, or using 
police vehicles for personal purposes.  R46 explained some of the aspects of this 
dilemma as follows:  
 there are a lot of pressures on the police officers to [support their families 
and kinship groups], and how can you say no?  …  Like how do you say, no 
you can't bring your fish back for your starving family; you'll have to work 
out some other way.  It's just that, those things I found a little bit confronting 
at times because you have to try and keep the peace I suppose because if 
you said no, … they would probably just not have a good relationship with 
me any more, so you have to draw the line somewhere ...  It's very easy for 
us to say, but for the local police they could never understand why you took 
that stance.  
Learning how to juggle these circumstances is a real operational challenge for 
many international policing personnel. While there will often be no clear or at 
least easy answers to these dilemmas, this type of challenge suggests that more 
could be done to prepare international police to anticipate such challenges 
arising through cultural awareness training, ethical role-plays and other devices, 
and to provide them with a range of tactics for managing them. 
 
Having a significant personal relationship with local police could at times enable 
the assurance that internationally endorsed policing standards were not 
breached in particular circumstances by local police. R6, who served in Papua 
New Guinea, explained that once trust was established, there could be quite 
frank discussions about behavioural change:  
 there was [a philosophy] to shoot first and ask questions later and we would go to a 
specific task were there was a possibility that there would be shootings, so and I 
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would implore these guys, okay we are not to shoot unless they shoot at us, … [so]  
you would have to impress upon them the importance of not killing anybody 
especially while we were there because we would get the blame and you know if you 
had any respect for us, you wouldn’t do it and that’s were that friendship and trust 
and that built up to a point and they would go okay, well we are not going to kill 
anyone, we won’t shoot anyone because we don’t want you to get into trouble.  Not 
because they don’t want to do it, because they just didn’t want to get us into trouble 
so okay.  
 
The sustainability of such positive influences is obviously left open to question 
by this example. It points to the importance of building effective impersonal 
controls, as well as relying upon personal influence, if longer-term change is to be 
sustained and sustainable. Despite the difficulties they encountered, respondents 
stressed the importance of establishing trusting police-public and peer-peer 
relationships, and the benefits for both sides of working to achieve this.  R61 
described this situation aptly in terms of the peacekeeping function, stating that 
a key goal was for local people ‘to understand that it was safe again in their 
community.  They were not going to be subject to the terrorisation that they had 
been subject to by the militant groups, that they could walk the street safely, that 
they could have confidence again in the police.’  This quote is a reminder that the 
capacity to improve very basic requirements of living and social life remains 
fundamentally important as a means of establishing some trust or trust-like 
conditions, especially in the early stages of missions. 
 
 
Trust building with the local community 
 
Respondents attempted to break down distrust and scepticism locally by 
demonstrating that Australian police were friendly and trustworthy.  The 
reasons for building trust were practical as well as noble. Achieving a measure of 
trust, it was viewed, ‘encouraged informants, it encouraged community support, 
we could go to safety levels, we could get our people amongst the community 
safely, we could start identifying with honing down where the trouble spots were 
so it has a lot of strategic gains’ (R29).  It was well recognised that ‘engendering 
that confidence would then start to bring people back in to report crimes that we 
could then use to support our mission objectives about removing these key 
people’ (R61).   
 
Part of the trust agenda for international missions is building trust in local 
institutions. A clear example of this was publicly backing up local police.  This 
could mean confronting local power structures and customary hierarchical 
relationships in the community. R15 noted that ‘some of the local VIPs in the 
village areas didn't respect the young police officers at all   … in that these guys 
would be ranting and raving and waving their arms at us [but] we’d say, “no, 
we’re not going anywhere”, and that probably helped the local police a little bit, 
in that we weren’t intimidated whereas they might have been.’  As noted earlier, 
when local people are more inclined to seek and trust the services of 
international police personnel over those of local police, putting the local police 
forward in order to build their capacity may, for international police, mean 
incurring the wrath of local people.  
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The topic of vetting of recruits to the local police can generate difficulties in terms 
of local perceptions of the effectiveness and impartiality of international police 
involved in this important aspect of reconstruction and capacity-building. This 
can occur when prior vetting of new recruits has not been carried out, or has 
been done hastily and in an incomplete and ineffective manner.4 Senior UN 
Police officers interviewed by the first author in Timor-Leste  in late 2006 
expressed the view that the attempt by the government there to ‘stand up’ the 
PNTL after the 2006 crisis was proceeding  too quickly and that sometimes 
former senior PNTL officers were being ‘waved through’ without sufficient 
regard to their criminal actions during the crisis.  This knowledge held by 
international policing personnel, whether in the form of belief or corroborated 
fact, as R43’s observation above perhaps implies, seems likely to influence how 
police-police relationships are shaped and operate. Perceptions by international 
police of defective character among senior local police bode badly in terms of 
being able to establish positive interpersonal relationships and in terms of 
pursuing capacity-building objectives. 
 
Importantly, local policing practices also impacted on Australian police’s 
disposition towards their counterparts. Often respondents indicated that 
trusting them was difficult because of their habits and ways of doing police work. 
These issues are captured by an officer who had served on several missions: 
especially in Papua New Guinea and I noticed it more in East Timor, the 
people had a fear of the police.  In PNG … they [police] had no support from 
up top or anywhere.  There was just no guidance.  And they wouldn’t work 
so the people sort of had no respect for the police anyway, but they feared 
them because they knew that if they did the wrong they would get an 
absolute flogging.  What I noticed over the time was they were starting to 
lose their fear of the police while we were there because the people knew 
that while we were there the people wouldn’t get a flogging and I notice in 
East Timor, more to the point, the Australia and New Zealanders were sort 
of known to be soft, where the Portuguese that were there, knew - they - the 
locals knew that if they mucked up in front of them there would be a scene.  
(R17) 
This description echoes Mastrofski et al’s (2002) notion of a vicious cycle of 
reciprocal disrespect between police and policed in marginalised communities. It 
also highlights the reality that redressing such cycles is deeply complex.  As the 
previous quotation suggests, there can be a public safety dividend from the 
restraining co-presence of international police in such circumstances, but one 
that is ultimately conditional on their ongoing presence rather than any enduring 
change within the local police force. 
 
Apparent inconsistencies in how international police personnel are treated by 
local people and police can undermine confidence in the trustworthiness of 
                                                 
4 It is very difficult to find extensive treatment of the police vetting issue in post-conflict settings in the 
policy or academic literatures. What occurs in practice too often reflects an international desire to 
restore local policing responsibility quickly, alongside an influential local interest in ensuring that 
favoured police are returned as soon as possible to the new institution, irrespective of their past 
misdeeds. As has been seen in Afghanistan and elsewhere, this can have fatal consequences for 
international police advisers as well as significant costs for others involved.  
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locals. Such perceptions often led international police to question their own 
methods as well as whether the mission goals were indeed appreciated or shared 
among the local population. This could justify a stance of caution and distrust on 
the part of international police personnel. Setbacks in the security situation 
perversely but somewhat understandably appeared to do significant damage to 
Australian police’s trust in the public.  R16 reflected that police had to remain on 
their guard and not assume that they had achieved positive relationships, stating 
that ‘In East Timor one minute, like, they’re changing your car tyre and the next 
minute they’re [throwing rocks at] you. So … you don't trust the people.’ This 
unpredictability or inconsistency could contribute to a stressful environment for 
officers who were used to being able to judge relationships and the dynamics of 
policing more accurately in Australia (Goldsmith 2009).  
 
Similarly, in the case of the large-scale civil disturbances in both the Solomon 
Islands and Timor in 2006, Australian police felt betrayed by the public, in that 
they were not informed of the pending unrest by any of their informants.  R29 
discussed this clearly, saying, 
The only difficulty came after the riots where you couldn’t cross the personal  
[inaudible] the major balance of society that was rioting and causing problems by 
stoning you and throwing machetes at you and so on and so forth.  So the problem 
was it was great up to the riots and a significant amount of respect and trust was 
lost post riots and you never knew who you trusted, therefore it took a long time 
to rebuild the confidence to trust locals, because during the riots you felt that 
everybody was against you. 
 
While feelings of betrayal and disappointment were evident, from a mission 
accomplishment and operational point of view, the question arises of how these 
feelings influence subsequent dealings with local police and members of the 
public. A robustness of attitude, informed by a tragic view of the possibilities of 
change in particular settings, would not seem inappropriate, and even could be 
seen as desirable or a necessary survival skill for overseas service. Muir (1983, 
7) describes the tragic view as “a philosophy which holds that good and bad 
inhere in each of us, that self-control is an important but not exclusive 
determinant of man’s fate, and that life is meaningful only if we give a damn 
about others, no matter how such concern hurts.” It is, Muir indicates, an 
antidote to the cynicism that too readily can emerge in police officers. Meeting 
local distrust with distrust from members of the mission seems certain to further 
undermine existing relationships and the pursuit of mission objectives. Our 
respondents, encouragingly, showed little evidence of any resentment impacting 
on their actions. In dealing with and building trust from the public, they arguably 
demonstrated both commitment and forbearance. Despite setbacks, they 
continued to work in this way – if perhaps more warily than before.  
 
Demonstrations of forbearance, as indicated by tolerance of differences of values 
and approaches, were evident in several of our respondents’ answers. Regarding 
Timor-Leste, R58 spoke of the persistent determination sometimes required to 
maintain this approach: 
I treat people with dignity and respect … so I don’t ever recall thinking “I’ll never 
get through to these people or whatever”, there were – of course there were 
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moments of frustration where I didn’t understand what was going on or things 
that they wanted were in conflict to things that I needed to do, but that’s just – 
you’ve just got to go with that.  You’ve just got to tolerate that.  That’s what 
missions are all about. You’re never going to get everything you want, it’s never 
going to happen in the time that you expect it to, and you just have to deal with the 
contingencies. 
A degree of fatalism (a tragic view) is evident in such remarks. An acceptance of 
difficulty in the job enables work to continue in part through making allowances 
for perceived shortcomings in the actions and attitudes of others.  
 
Finally, in terms of building trust with local police and local people, it should be 
noted that the very premises upon which international policing missions are 
undertaken lend themselves to making it difficult for international policing 
personnel to respect or trust local police and for local people to willingly trust 
either their own police or, at times, the international police. After all, it is due to a 
perceived breakdown in local security capacity or need for significant change 
that brings international police into these settings, yet very often, local 
expectations of international police are disappointed for various reasons 
including insufficient understanding of local circumstances and inadequate 
resources for dealing effectively with pressing problems. It is not surprising then 
that many international police will bring with them assumptions about the 
limited competence of local police as well as the fickleness of local people which 
can restrict demonstrations of respect towards counterparts and the community.  
 
Starting with the assumption that  local officers are generally incompetent, or 
that the majority of the local population can’t be trusted, amount to  obstacles to 
establishing trust. A willingness to trust presumptively indeed may be a 
prerequisite for securing trust in these circumstances. Against this idea, many of 
our respondents admitted to holding a generally negative perception of local 
capacity, identifying their particular counterparts as exceptions to this rule (see 
Harris 2010).  The fact that some respondents were able to distinguish their 
immediate counterparts from a more generalised negative assessment at least 
leaves open ways of working constructively with local counterparts. In future 
efforts to build interpersonal trust, further thought needs to be given to 
identifying and establishing forms of reciprocity of recognition between 
international and local people, so that differences that emerge in the life of 
missions can be managed positively rather than being assumed by one party to 
be indications of weakness by the other.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
[F]or us it was about re-establishing that community confidence.  It is getting them to 
understand that it was safe again in their community.  They were not going to be 
subject to the terrorisation that they had been subject to by the militant groups, that 
they could walk the street safely, that they could have confidence again in the police 
and engendering that confidence would then start to bring people back in to report 
crimes that we could then use to support our mission objectives about removing these 
key people (R61).   
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As this quotation indicates, ensuring conditions of public safety is fundamental to 
the enjoyment of individual freedom and cultural identity. Paradoxically, trust in 
police is often elusive when it is most needed in order to make restoration of 
public safety achievable. This paper has taken for granted the general value of 
there being trust in international policing mission settings between mission 
personnel, local police and people. Our data confirmed that this assumption was 
widely shared by our respondents. For them in general, it can be said,  
understandings of trust were crucial to how they approached their work and 
made sense of their experiences. Nonetheless, as the analysis of the data makes 
clear, often trust as a characteristic of interpersonal relationships and contacts is 
an ideal or an illusion, rather than a readily achievable objective under the 
conditions in which international policing missions are typically engaged.  
 
Given the difficulties of establishing trust, more attention is needed to the 
conditions that facilitate cooperation and collaboration between international 
policing personnel and local people and police.  In other words, identifying forms 
of positive engagement short of trusting relationships as well as steps on a path 
to building trust will prove important to improving how these missions work in 
particular settings in future. Here, collecting complementary data from local 
people and police is vital. In our study, we did not capture the views of those 
local police and members of the community with whom they had contact.  A 
more complete dataset would have sought to include their views in order to 
explore when trust is extended and what features of missions led to greater 
trustworthiness. It could also have made it possible to directly gauge the 
different kinds of motivational dispositions towards peacekeeping and capacity-
building objectives indicated in some of the recent literature (eg Braithwaite et al 
2007).  
 
More could be done to prepare international police personnel to anticipate the 
range of difficulties reported by our respondents, and to provide them with 
strategies for coping with them. We have seen that many respondents sought to 
build trust, yet were disappointed in what was achievable. Therefore, in 
preparing police personnel for future overseas deployments, efforts are needed 
to ensure that expectations in terms of local reception and cooperation are not 
unrealistically high. More preparation in terms of the difficulties of achieving 
quick change and indeed the changes favoured by international police – the 
tragic perspective – would be beneficial. Also, the inability to communicate with 
local people remains a common obstacle. Deficits in communicative competence 
work against practical accomplishments as well as normative convergence, both 
crucial to establishing trust.  
 
In short, rather on insisting on trust as a measure of achievement or as a 
necessary tool for making progress, there is a need for more realism. As noted, 
the instrumentalism seen in some local attitudes and actions should not be 
surprising. People habituated to distrusting others need material or at least 
tangible incentives if calculative trust is to emerge. This does not mean that other 
forms of trust cannot be developed over time. Changing values as well as 
practices will require a growing normative commitment among local police and 
local people if these changes are to be sustainable.  There are also likely to be 
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limits to how much reliance international personnel put on material incentives if 
an unhealthy, longer-term dependency is not to be created.  
 
Mission time-scales will continue to work against trust-building. There can be 
little doubt that short rotations work against establishing effective interpersonal 
trust, especially cognitive and normative trust. In addition to extending rotations 
(which Australia has done since our interviews), the process of building trust 
requires more  thinking about how to ensure more ‘quick wins’ and tangible 
improvements along the pathway of both peacekeeping and capacity-building. As 
noted, calculative sensibilities among those international policing personnel are 
working with have to be expected and managed effectively as part of giving effect 
to the relationships established. Establishing policing services to the most needy 
and vulnerable in ways responsive to their concerns must therefore be a priority 
‘on the ground’ as well as in mission policy objectives. 
 
Different means for dealing with distrust are also needed. International policing 
missions as well as the local institutions they are assisting need to subject 
themselves to a regulatory environment that is conducive to establishing trust. In 
short, institutional trust through accountability (eg an independent complaints 
authority) and measures of responsiveness (eg local level community safety 
committees) need to be established  publicly as part of the strategy of building 
trust more generally in police-community relations. Responding to distrust 
implies a number of other steps, including patience and forbearance, and a 
commitment from the beginning to negotiate expectations around the mission.  
 
In the end though, international policing missions engaged in peacekeeping and 
capacity-building will continue to take place in environments in which social 
disengagement from central government is commonplace, and in which broader 
social trust is scarce or non-existent. It is also the case, as we have seen, that 
failures at the strategic level (institutional trust) will inevitably impact upon 
operational achievements (interpersonal trust). Factors that impact upon the 
trustworthiness of government and political institutions generally, as well as the 
police in particular, will affect what can be achieved operationally in 
interpersonal trust in policing mission settings. Given these realities, there is 
relatively little that international policing missions can achieve by way of 
building trust and public confidence either quickly or by themselves. We need 
therefore to recognise the complexity of building trustworthy policing 
arrangements, important as they remain, and to avoid glib talk about trust until 
the challenges are better understood and begin to receive broader contextual 
support. Inevitably, the final responsibility for overcoming disengagement and 
defiance, and for building trustworthy police agencies, rests mainly with the 
local, national, regional, and international political systems and the communities 
in which they are located.  
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